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The British ‘welfare market’
Lessons from contracting out welfare to 
work programmes in Australia and the 
Netherlands
Dan FinnNovember 2008
From 2009 all long-term unemployed people will be referred 
for employment assistance to external New Deal ‘prime 
contractors’ paid largely according to their success in placing 
people into sustained employment.
Senior politicians of all parties are in agreement that such a ‘welfare 
market’ will lead to service innovation, improved accountability, better 
job outcomes, greater value for money, and better customer service, 
citing the success of market-based reform in countries such as 
Australia and the Netherlands. 
This report looks in detail at the development and impact of the 
Australian and Dutch welfare markets. 
This report considers:
• how welfare markets in each country operate and how well the 
systems deliver the benefi ts that policy-makers anticipate; 
• the risks involved in contracting out these services; and
• the impact that welfare market delivery has had on services 
for the most disadvantaged jobseekers and on the non-profi t 
organisations that play a signifi cant role in meeting their needs. 
The fi nal chapter refl ects on the implications of these fi ndings for the 
design and implementation of the British welfare market and how 
policy-makers may further safeguard the interests of service users.
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5Executive summary
There is consensus among senior politicians that 
such a market will lead to service innovation, 
improved accountability, better job outcomes, 
greater value for money and better customer 
service. These assumptions are justifi ed by 
frequent reference to ‘international best practice’ 
and the success of market-based reform in 
countries such as Australia and the Netherlands. 
This report contains detailed fi ndings on the 
development and impact of the Australian and 
Dutch welfare markets.
The Australian Job Network (JN) was created 
in 1998 and, in a decade, made the transition from 
‘radical experiment’ to established institution. Its 
design changed as policy-makers adapted the 
model to secure greater effi ciencies, to deal with 
unanticipated effects and, through successive 
‘welfare reforms’, to redefi ne services to ‘activate’ 
more working age benefi t claimants. The evidence 
suggests the JN delivers more job outcomes for 
half the cost of the previous system.
The Dutch ‘reintegration market’ was 
fully established in 2002. Municipalities and 
the social insurance agency (UWV) purchase 
reintegration services from private providers. The 
cost of UWV reintegration ‘trajectories’ fell from 
an estimated €4,700 to between €2,500 and 
€3,000 by 2007. The ‘work fi rst’ and ‘workfare’ 
programmes introduced by municipalities have 
cut costs and increased the number of social 
assistance claimants leaving benefi ts and entering 
employment. Recent Individual Reintegration 
Agreements (IROs) signal a new phase with the 
potential for a more responsive, client-driven 
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system – at least for those claiming social 
insurance benefi ts.
The evidence reveals, however, that contracting 
out employment assistance services is not a 
simple option and both the Australian and Dutch 
systems have been in fl ux over time. Securing 
the delivery of government objectives through 
contracts is prone to the same implementation 
problems experienced in public sector delivery 
systems. Contracting out poses further challenges 
because it fragments programme responsibility 
among multiple contractors, changes the 
relationship between those who design policy and 
those who deliver front-line services, and blurs 
lines of responsibility and accountability.
The degree of success of performance-based 
contracting is contested. Evaluations suggest 
a typical improvement of the short-term job 
prospects of participants by around 5 to 10 per 
cent, and they are more quickly attained than 
through more standardised programmes. The 
cost-effi ciency gains attributed to the Dutch and 
Australian models appear signifi cant, but relatively 
little is known about the extent to which these 
gains have been offset by high transaction costs 
for the purchaser, providers and service users.
Parking, price competition and 
benefi t savings
In both Australia and the Netherlands, incentive-
based contracts have been associated with 
‘parking’ harder-to-help service users, even though 
greater rewards may be paid, as in Australia, for 
The latest phase of British welfare reform involves 
the creation of a managed welfare market. The 
principles of the Government’s new delivery 
strategy will be applied as part of the ‘fl exible New 
Deal’ (fND). From 2009, all long-term unemployed 
people will be referred for employment assistance to 
external ‘prime contractors’ paid largely according 
to their success in placing people into sustained 
employment.
6 Executive summary
placing ‘highly disadvantaged’ jobseekers into 
jobs. Private and public providers in incentive 
and target-driven systems are more likely to 
concentrate their efforts on those participants 
closer to the labour market, while harder-to-help 
participants receive fewer services.
A distinctive contributory factor to parking 
has been price competition – now abandoned in 
Australia and the Netherlands. Price competition 
encouraged unrealistic cost estimates that 
subsequently limited provider capacity, stifl ed 
innovation and encouraged parking. It seems 
clear that too great an emphasis on cost reduction 
undermines service quality.
In the absence of price competition, the 
challenge for the purchaser is to determine the 
level and combination of fees and outcome 
payments to ensure service quality for all 
participants and suffi cient incentives for providers. 
The model for the fND envisages a 20 per cent 
service fee with 80 per cent of provider income 
dependent on interim (13-week) and full (26-week) 
job outcomes. This will provide fi nancial incentives 
but advocates and policy-makers should be 
vigilant for parking if prime contractors or their 
subcontractors prioritise the more job-ready in an 
effort to secure cash fl ow and early profi tability.
Expenditure savings arise not only from 
downward pressure on prices but also from 
reductions in benefi t caseloads. Budgeting rules 
for Dutch municipalities now enable them to 
reinvest savings from benefi ts into employment 
assistance or use them for other purposes. Steps 
towards such a model are now emerging in the 
UK. Such an incentive system needs careful 
design to ensure that those entitled receive 
benefi ts and that priority is on assisting service 
users into employment, rather than simply on 
deterring applications. While a stronger ‘gateway’ 
role, as in the Netherlands, can ensure that only 
those eligible receive benefi t, there is a risk that 
new procedures and reward incentives may deter 
and reinforce the exclusion of marginalised groups.
Service quality and outcome 
payments
Evidence on the quality and variability of the 
services delivered is mixed. More positive 
assessments highlight how the capacity of front-
line case managers is enhanced when they 
have fl exibility to tailor support to individuals and 
broker job placements with employers. More 
critical evaluations suggest that providers ‘crowd 
around’ less costly jobsearch assistance. Incentive 
payment systems need careful design if they 
are to encourage service innovation, substantial 
investment in training, wage subsidies or other 
forms of more expensive assistance for those with 
signifi cant employment barriers.
To tackle problems with parking and improve 
transparency, Australian and Dutch purchasers 
have introduced greater specifi cation of service 
requirements and shorter periods of intensive 
assistance. These developments have relevance 
for the fND where providers will enjoy considerable 
fl exibility over the year that participants may be 
with them. It is easy to envisage an outcome 
similar to that under the fi rst JN contracts where 
providers concentrated service provision during the 
initial stages and towards the end of the process, 
with little contact in between. To guard against 
this, Jobcentre Plus personal advisers should 
have a continuing responsibility for monitoring the 
quality of individual provision delivered within the 
existing New Deals.
Consideration should be given also to a 
mechanism such as the Australian Jobseeker 
Account, to ensure that a signifi cant element of 
the public budget involved is ‘ring-fenced’ for 
investment in jobseekers. Such a ‘guaranteed’ 
budget would assure case managers of 
discretionary resources to deliver fl exible 
investment in disadvantaged jobseekers and 
would constrain negative tendencies for profi t-
taking.
Signifi cantly, as in Great Britain, both Australia 
and the Netherlands have introduced new funding 
streams for vocational training. A key challenge 
is to ensure that prime contractors and training 
providers integrate the additional and pre-
vocational support necessary to allow long-term 
unemployed people to take advantage of the 
opportunities created.
Star ratings and innovation
The emerging British ‘star rating’ performance 
system appears designed to avoid some 
unintended effects of the Australian relative 
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performance system. For example, it measures 
performance in relation to individual contracts 
and includes a quality and contract compliance 
assessment. Nevertheless, as the system is 
extended to cover all programmes, care must 
be taken to ensure it does not create perverse 
incentives and shape provider behaviour in 
negative ways.
When service delivery is devolved to 
independent providers, the purchaser loses insight 
into the ‘why’ of ‘what works’. Contractors and 
their front-line staff inevitably gain an advantage 
as they develop greater operational knowledge 
of how to achieve specifi ed outcomes. Some of 
this insight gap may be bridged through contract 
management, audit and inspection. It is not clear, 
however, that welfare market delivery will fi gure 
highly in the priorities of the learning-focused and 
wide-ranging remit of the Offi ce for Standards 
in Education, Children’s Services and Skills that 
recently absorbed the Adult Learning Inspectorate. 
The new standards body and the National Audit 
Offi ce could learn directly from the experiences 
of the equivalent bodies in Australia and the 
Netherlands to develop a coherent programme 
to monitor and assess how the welfare market 
delivers the expected improvements.
It seems clear from international experience 
that competition alone may not be suffi cient to 
drive continuous improvement and, after an initial 
period, further innovation. The development and 
spread of best practice requires both contract 
redesign and exchanges through networks that 
extend beyond individual organisations and often 
across sectors. Contract managers may be able 
to do some of this but the Department for Work 
and Pensions (DWP) and other interested bodies, 
such as provider and third-sector associations, 
will need to further develop a more open structure 
for brokering information exchange and technical 
advice involving prime contractors, subcontractors, 
related public sector organisations and groups that 
can articulate the perspective of service users.
Service user safeguards: ‘voice and 
choice’
Service user journeys across mixed public and 
private provision are complicated, especially for 
the most disadvantaged. There are increased risks 
associated with the fND because of its duration, 
subcontractor delivery chains and the requirement 
for regular contact with a private provider while 
continuing to ‘sign on’ fortnightly with Jobcentre 
Plus (JCP). Service users need clear and timely 
information to avoid ‘mixed messages’ and it 
will be important to monitor trends in sanctions 
imposed and in provider referrals.
The DWP stresses the importance attached to 
‘excellent customer experience’ and that service 
users should have ‘informed choice’, including 
choice between prime contractors where available. 
The evidence from Australia suggests that, for 
‘informed choice’ to be meaningful, users need 
clear information on the providers with whom they 
will be placed and on the content of the service on 
offer. Such information should be communicated 
about fND providers before service users come 
to the end of their time with JCP. While choice 
is constrained by the jobsearch obligations 
of Jobseeker’s Allowance (JSA) recipients, 
individuals should still be able to exercise choice 
at the point of recruitment and after their fi rst 
month of participation. They should be able to 
move at any time if they have legitimate grounds 
to be dissatisfi ed with their experience. Such 
choices should not be restricted to one or two 
prime contractors but extended to the different 
subcontractors available. There should be fl exibility 
to ensure that providers who attract participants 
can expand their capacity to accommodate user 
choice.
More radically, the success of IROs in the 
Netherlands suggests there may be scope for a 
user-driven alternative to the rather constrained 
choice on offer in the fND. IROs give service users 
more time to choose a provider and negotiate the 
kind of employment assistance they receive, and 
the results appear promising. Experiments with 
such an approach might be tested fi rst in specialist 
DWP disability provision and, if successful, 
extended to fND. It may be feasible for prime 
contractors themselves to experiment with such 
an approach.
Comparative evidence on welfare markets 
confi rms the importance of contracting agencies 
independently monitoring client experience and 
ensuring that robust systems are in place to 
respond to complaints of unfair treatment and 
poor service delivery. DWP should consider 
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the introduction of a clear Service Guarantee, 
as developed in Australia, with recourse to an 
independent complaints line. It should ensure 
all fND delivery sites display such a Service 
Guarantee with information on how to make 
complaints and require providers to keep a 
complaints register. It is important also to establish 
clear lines of responsibility and inter-agency 
collaboration in handling complaints, and to 
develop a comprehensive system for collating 
complaints information.
Contracted providers and non-profi t 
organisations
In all three countries, both for-profi t and non-
profi t providers have emerged as a distinct 
interest group and powerful lobbying force, 
sometimes with competing interests about their 
relative competitive advantages. Providers have 
a legitimate interest in lobbying for additional 
resources and reform of market design so long 
as it is borne in mind that provider interests do 
not always correspond with those of users as well 
as those of the purchaser. It must be recognised 
also that the interests of many local and smaller 
charities and community-based organisations may 
differ from those of larger national charities that 
may have a more powerful voice.
The involvement of non-profi t organisations 
in welfare markets has raised concerns about 
the relationship between their values and social 
mission and the constraints of contract delivery. 
There has been some evidence of ‘mission drift’ 
induced through the requirements of contracts, 
especially in the role that providers play in 
imposing conditionality and referring people for 
sanctions.
The relationship with providers at times can 
be uncomfortable for government. In Australia, 
for example, there was particular controversy 
about ‘gagging clauses’ in contracts between 
government and providers that progressively 
sought to constrain their freedom to make public 
criticisms. Such criticism is an important dimension 
of public debate and encourages accountability. 
DWP contracts and those of primes with 
subcontractors should allow informed and free 
comment, and not constrain the ability of small 
and large non-profi ts in particular to advocate on 
behalf of disadvantaged communities.
It will be important to monitor the dominant 
role of larger providers in the British market. The 
transition to prime contractors is likely to reshape 
the landscape, with for-profi t organisations with 
access to risk capital dominating service provision. 
The future for many voluntary and community-
based organisations, and for some for-profi t 
providers, will be as subcontractors. It will be 
important to understand the impacts of the new 
market on the organisational capacity and social 
capital of local areas, and the extent to which 
this may be at risk should market conditions 
change and larger for-profi ts ‘buy out’ contracts 
and remove their capital to seek greater profi ts 
elsewhere.
Contracts and accountability
Contracts for the delivery of employment 
assistance services involve more than commercial 
considerations. These include clauses that seek 
to shape the ways in which providers exercise 
operational discretion, encouraging contractors 
and their staff to act with the professionalism 
expected of public offi cials. The accountability of 
contracted providers is, however, more limited than 
that of public providers concerning, for example, 
the scrutiny role of parliamentary committees, audit 
authorities and the Human Rights Act (1998), and 
they are beyond the scope of the ombudsman.
Contracting out employment and other 
such services poses challenges for political 
accountability. There is considerable scope for 
‘blame shifting’ and the responsibility for poor 
performance is less obvious. In this context, 
the role of independent research, challenge and 
scrutiny is of particular importance, especially 
where political consensus is so wide and where 
ministers, senior offi cials and providers have 
a clear interest in promoting the success of 
contracting out.
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The rights and responsibilities of adults without 
jobs have been redefi ned and the public sector 
institutions that deliver working age benefi ts and 
employment programmes have been reformed. 
The latest phase of change involves both 
extending jobsearch and work activity obligations 
to lone parents and people with health problems 
and disabilities and a ‘major transformation’ in the 
delivery of welfare to work programmes (DWP, 
2007a, p. 9). In future, most employment-related 
services for people on working age benefi ts are 
to be delivered through a ‘managed welfare 
market’ (WPSC, 2007, ev. para. 112). Unlike other 
markets, however, purchasing power does not 
come directly from consumers but from public 
sector agencies. Services in this ‘quasi market’ 
will be delivered by a diverse range of private, 
voluntary and public sector organisations.
Over the past ten years, there has been 
much experimentation with private sector delivery 
of employment programmes and in how the 
Government contracts with them. Recently, there 
has been increased emphasis on paying providers 
for performance in getting people into jobs and 
for Jobcentre Plus (JCP) to reduce transaction 
costs by entering larger contracts with fewer 
providers. By 2007, the number of providers 
that JCP contracted with directly had fallen from 
some 2,000 to a network of some 900 for-profi t 
and non-profi t providers delivering services with 
an estimated value of about £950 million (DWP, 
2007a, p. 28).
Further signifi cant change is envisaged 
following the ‘Freud Report’, commissioned by the 
Government in 2007 (Freud, 2007). It proposed 
the extension of employment requirements to more 
workless people and the expansion of employment 
programme provision. This would be delivered 
through a national network of private sector ‘prime 
contractors’ paid according to their success in 
placing people into sustained employment.
Introduction
The proposals were welcomed by the then 
Prime Minister Tony Blair and by his successor 
Gordon Brown as the ‘fi rst stage in the next 
decade of welfare reform’ (Grice, 2007). The 
Liberal Democrats (2007, p. 21) cited Freud in 
support of their proposal to ‘give the voluntary 
and private sector responsibility for delivering 
the full range of back-to-work support’; and 
in 2008 the Conservative Party endorsed the 
‘clear way forward’ offered by Freud in shaping 
its proposed ‘managed market for back to work 
employment services’ (Conservative Party, 2008, 
p. 27). Subsequently, the Secretary of State for 
Work and Pensions published a comprehensive 
‘Commissioning Strategy’. It detailed government 
plans to simplify and rationalise existing welfare 
to work contracts and to realise the ‘radical vision 
of David Freud’s proposals’ (DWP, 2008a, p. 7). 
This was followed by a further welfare reform 
Green Paper committing the Government to 
implementing all of the Freud proposals (DWP, 
2008b, p. 7).
The Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) 
is now directly responsible for commissioning and 
managing the welfare market. DWP envisages that 
it will do ‘80 per cent of its business’ with a ‘stable 
core of reliable top tier’ or prime contractors 
capable of delivering multiple contracts across the 
country (DWP, 2008a, p. 10). Smaller providers will 
act mainly as subcontractors. Successful prime 
contractors will be awarded contracts that last 
usually for fi ve years, with the possibility of two-
year extensions. Most of the funding will reward 
sustained job outcomes for employment that lasts 
initially for six months, but with the aspiration of 
moving beyond this to reward providers if they 
keep people in employment for a year or 18 
months.
The principles of the new strategy will be 
applied fi rst to the fl exible New Deal (fND) that will 
replace all existing New Deal and Employment 
Zone provision for the JSA unemployed from 2009 
Introduction
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(DWP, 2007b). The future delivery of employability 
services through these performance-based 
contracts represents ‘a major milestone in [the] 
welfare reform programme’ and for successful 
providers ‘the rewards will be high, with longer 
contracts and a growing market’ (Purnell, 2008).
Consensus and international 
comparisons
There appears to be consensus among senior 
British politicians that delivery of employment 
programmes by for-profi t and third-sector 
organisations through a welfare market will lead to 
service innovation, improved accountability, better 
job outcomes, greater value for money and better 
customer service. These claims are justifi ed by 
frequent reference to ‘international best practice’ 
and to evidence from British ‘Employment Zones’ 
(EZs). In particular, the respective proposals of all 
the parties point to the ‘success’ of welfare reform 
in countries such as Australia and the Netherlands 
that began to contract out case management and 
employment assistance services on a large scale 
in the late 1990s. The Freud Report describes 
them as ‘world leaders’ (Freud, 2007, p. 57).
In the past decade, employment rates 
have increased and regular unemployment 
has fallen signifi cantly in the UK, Australia and 
the Netherlands, although in both comparator 
countries more people are in part-time work (see 
Table 1). In all three countries there has been 
pressure to increase economic participation rates 
because of ageing populations and a marked 
increase in the number of working age people on 
long-term disability benefi ts. Each country has 
pursued ‘work fi rst’ activation policies targeted 
at the unemployed and this approach has been 
progressively extended to previously ‘inactive’ 
lone parents and people with health problems and 
disabilities. The relative success of the strategies 
used in Australia and the Netherlands has been 
attributed in part to the ways in which they have 
outsourced public sector provision, including 
the creation of quasi markets for delivering 
employment assistance.
While Australia and the Netherlands 
provide useful comparators for the UK, they 
have distinctive labour markets, governance 
arrangements and welfare systems. Australia 
has a federal system of government, and in the 
Netherlands, local government (the ‘municipalities’) 
plays a direct role in delivering working age 
benefi ts and has stronger powers than in either 
the UK or Australia. The Netherlands also provides 
more generous benefi ts for working age people 
Table 1: Comparative population and labour market data: Australia, Netherlands and UK (OECD 
standardised)
 Year Australia Netherlands UK
Population (000) 2006 20,605 16,356 60,587
Total labour force (000) 2006 10,765 8,562 29,942
Total employment (000) 2006 10,241 8,176 29,338
Unemployment (000) 2006 524 385 1,604
Labour force participation rate (%) 1994 73.2 68.6 76.0
 2006 75.9 75.7 76.7
Part-time employment (%) 1994 24.4 28.9 22.4
 2006 27.1 35.5 23.4
Unemployment rate (%) 1994 9.5 6.8 9.3
 2006 4.9 3.9 5.3
Long-term unemployed (12 months+) (%) 1994 36.1 49.4 45.4
 2006 17.8 45.2 22.1
Source: OECD Online Statistics and Statistical Annex, OECD Employment Report, 2007.
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and invests more in labour market programmes, 
such as subsidised employment, a factor that 
may be linked to its higher level of long-term 
unemployment (OECD, 2006).
Despite many references to the positive impact 
of the respective reforms in both countries, there is 
little detailed knowledge in the UK about how both 
systems work and their respective impact on the 
experiences of service users.
The research
The research design combined an evidence and 
literature review with fi ndings from interviews 
with policy-makers and analysts undertaken 
in both countries in 2007. The review covered 
English language offi cial reports and evaluations, 
independent studies from various policy institutes 
and academics, and fi ndings from audit, oversight 
and regulatory authorities.
The report
This report does not consider the normative 
arguments concerning the private delivery 
of welfare to work services. It offers a critical 
contribution to the British knowledge base on 
how welfare markets in each country operate 
and insight into how well the systems deliver the 
benefi ts that policy-makers anticipate. It considers 
in particular the risks involved in contracting 
out these services and the impact that welfare 
market delivery has had on services for the most 
disadvantaged jobseekers and on the non-profi t 
organisations that play a signifi cant role in meeting 
their needs.
The transition to performance-based contracts 
offers the potential for innovation, fl exibility and 
effi ciency savings, but the diffi culties of managing 
complex services through contracts also has 
important risks for service access, costs, quality 
and accountability (Heinreich and Choi, 2007; 
Pollock et al., 2007). There are two particular risks 
associated with welfare to work performance-
based contracts. The fi rst is ‘creaming’, where 
contractors who are paid by results are likely to 
concentrate their efforts on those participants 
closest to the labour market and more easily 
placed in a job. The second risk is ‘parking’ where 
other participants will receive a bare minimum of 
services and are unlikely to make any progress 
while participating in a programme. Arguably the 
most disadvantaged, those with the greatest 
employment barriers, are the most likely to be 
‘parked’.
In the following chapters, the report presents 
fi ndings from the evidence review on how these 
risks were managed in Australia and Holland, and 
on the impacts of their respective systems. The 
fi nal chapter refl ects on the implications of these 
fi ndings for the design and implementation of the 
British welfare market, and the ways in which 
policy-makers may further safeguard the interests 
of service users.
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The Australian Job Network (JN) was created in 
1998 and, in a decade, made the transition from 
‘radical experiment’ to established institution. Its 
design changed as policy-makers adapted the 
model to secure greater effi ciencies, to deal with 
unanticipated effects and, through successive 
‘welfare reforms’, to redefi ne services to ‘activate’ 
more working age benefi t claimants. Nearly all 
federal employment services are now outsourced 
and regulated through JN-type tendering and 
performance arrangements with an estimated 
overall value of A$2.1 billion for 2008–09.
The JN is a managed quasi market providing 
scope for competition, some degree of choice 
for jobseekers, fl exibility in the way services are 
delivered and fi nancial rewards for successful 
providers (PC, 2002). Since the JN’s inception, the 
Australian Government has maintained that it has 
cost much less and consistently outperformed the 
former system (Thomas, 2007). In this context, 
the JN model has been a primary source of ‘policy 
learning’ as other OECD countries have sought to 
test the outsourcing of such services.
The following sections describe the evolution 
of the JN. They consider how the Australian 
market works, how the contracting system has 
changed and evidence on its impacts and costs. 
In particular, they consider the experience of 
disadvantaged jobseekers, the rights of service 
users and the impact that involvement has had on 
non-profi t organisations.
The Job Network
Federal ministers and the Department for 
Employment and Workplace Relations (DEWR)1 are 
accountable for the design and delivery of the JN. 
DEWR has a ‘business partnership arrangement’ 
with the public sector agency Centrelink to deliver 
services related to employment and referral. 
DEWR manages and monitors the JN through its 
central offi ce in Canberra and 19 regional offi ces 
that employ around 500 staff involved in contract 
management.
The JN has experienced three distinct 
periods marked by different ‘employment service 
contracts’ and is now made up of core JN 
members who deliver a full range of services. 
There is a wider network of licensed job placement 
organisations that provide vacancy fi nding and job 
matching services.
In 1997, over 1,000 organisations submitted 
tenders, from which 306 core JN members were 
selected. By 2007, the number of core providers 
had fallen to 99 delivering services from over 
1,000 sites in 137 ‘employment service areas’. 
The increased availability of network services was 
of particular importance given the geography 
of Australia and was contrasted with the 296 
front-line offi ces previously operated by the 
Commonwealth Employment Service. JN ‘sites’ 
vary in size, with most having between one and 
twelve staff members, and very few having more 
than 20 (DEWR, 2006). In most locations, the sites 
of different JN organisations are clustered around 
Centrelink offi ces.
The core network of JN members comprises 
a range of generalist and specialist organisations, 
with about 60 per cent of market share controlled 
by 13 larger generalist providers, with fi ve of those 
responsible for nearly 40 per cent of delivery. The 
market is shared almost equally between for-profi t 
and non-profi t agencies (see Table 2).
Initially, the privatised ex-Commonwealth 
Employment Service public sector provider 
was awarded a signifi cant market share, but it 
struggled in the new environment and, by 2003, 
had gone out of business. The most notable 
growth has been in the employment services 
organisations established by and through 
organised religious institutions. By 2004, Mission 
Australia and the Salvation Army were the largest 
agencies in the network.
1  The Australian Job 
Network
The Australian Job Network
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Access to the Job Network and the 
role of Centrelink
Although employment assistance has been 
privatised, working age benefi t entitlements 
continue to be assessed and paid through 
‘Centrelink’, a public sector executive agency 
(see Appendix 1 for a brief description of the main 
working age benefi ts).
Centrelink acts as the gateway to the JN. 
Before a new claim interview, jobseekers should 
‘where practical’ attend an ‘information seminar’ 
that will explain the services offered through the 
JN and provide information on providers available 
in their area. At the interview, the jobseeker must 
choose the provider with whom they wish to 
register. If a jobseeker makes no choice, they are 
allocated randomly to a provider.
When a person makes a new claim for 
benefi t, the fi rst interview involves completion of a 
computer-based diagnostic tool, the ‘Jobseeker 
Classifi cation Instrument’ (JSCI). It consists of 30 
questions (reduced from 60 in 2003) intended 
to be answered quickly about age, education, 
disability, language skills and so on. The 
responses are used to identify the likelihood of 
long-term unemployment. If designated as ‘highly 
disadvantaged’, the individual enters intensive 
employment assistance with a higher level of 
discretionary funding available.
The JSCI produces a measure of relative 
disadvantage. It is the Government that 
determines the proportion of jobseekers who 
qualify as highly disadvantaged. The proportion 
of highly disadvantaged jobseekers fell from as 
much as 33 per cent in the early phase of the JN 
to 10 per cent by 2007 (NESA, 2008, p. 25). Over 
the same period, however, the proportion of the 
JN caseload receiving income support for more 
than fi ve years increased from 10 to 25 per cent 
(DEEWR, 2008, p. 4). This change reduced the 
resources available to Job Network members, 
even though they now had to work with a harder-
to-help client group.
The JSCI score may trigger a further referral for 
a Job Capacity Assessment, undertaken through 
contracts with other public sector providers. These 
assessments are targeted at those with ‘signifi cant 
employment barriers’. Those with disabilities 
are assessed in terms of the number of hours of 
work they can manage and whether they qualify 
for Disability Support Pension (DSP). Jobseekers 
whose circumstances prevent them from working 
until certain barriers are addressed may be referred 
by the assessor to a range of other programmes, 
including specialist provision for young people, for 
those with disabilities, or to a Personal Support 
Programme. Most providers of these programmes 
are non-profi t organisations and the number of 
places is limited.
In both JSCI and JCA processes, minorities 
of users fail to reveal issues that would affect their 
classifi cation. These often come to light after the 
person has registered with a provider. In the early 
phase of the JN this resulted in many re-referrals 
to Centrelink, but subsequently JN providers were 
allowed to reclassify participants. This not only 
increased the support available for the individual 
but also meant the provider would be paid a 
higher fee for a job outcome and it would improve 
the provider’s relative performance. This fl exibility 
Table 2: Market share of Job Network by type of organisation (%)
 Number of agencies Public For-profi t Non-profi t
1996–97* 243 55 20 25
1998 306 33 37 30
2000 205 8 45 47
2003 109 3 47 50
*  Contracted case management only.
Source: adapted from Eardley (2003, Table 1).
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was to create unintended consequences when it 
was found that some inappropriately reclassifi ed 
their participants. In 2007, several providers were 
required to make repayments, amounting in the 
case of the Salvation Army to A$9 million.
Centrelink continues to be responsible for 
the imposition of benefi t penalties, against which 
claimants have legal rights of appeal. JN members 
submit ‘participation reports’ when a claimant fails 
to attend interviews or to meet their activity-related 
obligations. Benefi t sanctions have escalated 
and penalties increased in the wake of welfare 
reforms and the introduction of ‘mutual obligation’ 
programmes (see Box 1).
Box 1: Mutual obligation, Work 
for the Dole and welfare reform
The JN developed alongside parallel ‘mutual 
obligation’ programmes that arose from a 
wider welfare reform agenda.
The idea of ‘mutual obligation’ emerged in 
1997 when the Prime Minister announced 
the introduction of a Work for the Dole (WftD) 
programme where long-term unemployed 
people would be required to fulfi l their ‘mutual 
obligation’ to society. The concept underpinned 
successive welfare reform policies designed to 
further ‘activate’ the benefi t system. As in the 
UK, these reforms have involved the extension 
of work requirements to lone parents and, 
since 2006, lone parents whose youngest 
child is aged over eight years and a partnered 
parent with care whose youngest child is over 
six must actively seek work of at least 15 hours 
a week. At the same time disability benefi t 
entitlement was changed and those assessed 
as capable of working between 15 and 29 
hours a week must also seek employment of at 
least 15 hours a week. Both groups now claim 
the ‘activity-tested’ Newstart Allowance and 
participate in JN services or more specialist 
employment programmes.
In addition to meeting jobsearch and work 
availability conditions, unemployed Newstart 
claimants currently have to meet ‘mutual 
obligation’ requirements after each six months 
of unemployment. Each individual has to 
undertake an ‘approved activity’, which may 
include part-time or voluntary work for up to 
six months. Most are required to participate 
for up to 15 hours a week in a WftD project to 
improve ‘work habits’.
Delivery of WftD is contracted out to non-profi t 
and for-profi t ‘community work co-ordinators’ 
who organise project development and 
placements largely with charities, community 
organisations and local government. The 
organisations are contracted to ensure places 
are available, that participants engage and that 
community benefi t is delivered. There are no 
payments for helping participants obtain jobs.
(Continued)
The referral processes between Centrelink, the JN 
and mutual obligation programmes are complex. 
In 2001, the OECD found ‘no show’ rates after 
Centrelink referral ranging between 30 and 60 per 
cent, which not only had an impact on the viability 
of individual providers, but was also a key factor 
behind a major increase in administrative benefi t 
sanctions (Pearce et al., 2002). In the wake of 
further welfare reform in 2006, JN members were 
put under pressure to report claimants who failed 
to meet their participation requirements. Centrelink 
struggled to manage the workload resulting from 
an estimated half a million ‘participation failures’ 
reported in the fi rst year. It was only after challenge 
that Centrelink ceased to automatically suspend 
payments in all such cases and now does so only 
after they are investigated.
Job Network services and contracts 
(1998–2003)
The JN delivers a job placement and matching 
service, and more intensive services for the 
longer-term unemployed. Most JN funding is 
allocated to intensive services. In most locations, 
DEWR ensures the presence of several agencies 
to induce competition and provide choice for 
jobseekers.
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In the fi rst two contracting periods, 
employment assistance consisted of short 
‘jobsearch training’ courses for people usually 
unemployed for six months and ‘intensive 
assistance’ (IA) for those out of work for over a 
year or identifi ed as being at risk of long-term 
unemployment. Those referred to IA were eligible 
for assistance for 12 or 15 months, depending 
on their degree of disadvantage. This could be 
extended for up to 18 or 21 months by mutual 
agreement.
The fi rst contracts (1998–2000) were based on 
fi xed prices for more intensive services and a bid 
price for job matching services. JN members were 
paid a combination of ‘up front’ fee payments and 
job outcome payments after 13 weeks (interim) 
and 26 weeks (fi nal). Submitted tenders were 
assessed initially on meeting quality standards and 
then by price. Nearly 80 per cent of successful 
providers had held previous contracts for delivering 
federal labour market programmes (PC, 2002).
In the second contracts (2000–03), price 
competition was extended to the more intensive 
services subject to a minimum ‘fl oor’ price set by 
the department. Bids were assessed on quality 
as well as price, but it was found that successful 
tenders settled around the pre-determined ‘fl oor’ 
price. The second tendering round took place 
during 1999 and the process had a major impact 
on DEWR and JN members. Uncertainty and the 
administrative and organisational effort required to 
produce and assess bids resulted in a noticeable 
fall in job entry performance.
The JN contracts for 2000–03 involved 
changes designed to regulate the services given, 
especially to the most disadvantaged users. 
Providers had to include a ‘declaration of intent’ as 
part of their tender, which outlined the strategies 
and service options they would make available 
for participants. They were required to draw up 
an agreement with each IA participant. DEWR 
contract managers monitored the extent to which 
providers delivered on their ‘declaration of intent’, 
which included indicators such as the ratio of 
clients to case managers and the frequency of 
contact with participants (PC, 2002, p. 4.15).
The most important innovation was the 
introduction of comparative ‘star ratings’ from 
1999. The original aim was to inform participant 
(and employer) choice, but the ‘stars’ have been 
used mainly to drive provider performance (PC, 
2002; ANAO, 2005b). In 2001, the methodology 
was developed with regression adjustments 
for labour market conditions and participant 
characteristics allowing a more rigorous 
comparison of local provider performance. The 
regression formula has been revised but there 
is continuing criticism of its weakness in taking 
regional/area differences into account (Lam, 2007). 
Star ratings do not take into account qualitative 
factors such as customer satisfaction or the 
number of complaints about a provider.
The rating system allocates scores distributed 
between one and fi ve stars in half-star increments. 
They are ranked so that, on a national basis, about 
70 per cent of providers of JN sites are rated at 
three stars or better; 5 per cent are rated at fi ve 
stars and 4 per cent at one star (PC, 2002, p. 
4.16). DEWR estimates that, within two years of 
introducing the revised star ratings, 13-week job 
placements increased from 15 to 35 per cent. 
From the providers’ perspective, however, the 
forced relative ranking appears perverse, as it 
means that a signifi cant group of sites must be 
ranked as poor performers even if they maintain or 
increase their absolute performance.
Evaluations of the fi rst phase of the 
Job Network
The most comprehensive evaluations of the JN 
were undertaken during the fi rst two contract 
periods. These included the results from DEWR’s 
own in-house evaluation, and independent 
reviews from the OECD and Australian Productivity 
Commission.
The evaluations suggested that the purchaser-
provider framework was working and that 
performance rating, outcome payments and 
competition had created incentives for improved 
effi ciency. The JN was performing as well as 
the earlier Commonwealth Employment Service 
system and at much lower cost (DEWRSB, 2001; 
OECD, 2001). The Productivity Commission 
concluded that the advantages of the new market 
‘outweigh its limitations’ because ‘it sets out clear 
objectives, provides stronger incentives for fi nding 
ways of achieving job outcomes and encourages 
cost effi ciency’ (PC, 2002, p. xxvi).
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Signifi cant problems, however, had emerged. 
The DEWR evaluation reported that most IA 
employment assistance was given in the fi rst few 
months of participation, when most job entries 
were secured. Over time, client contact with 
case managers diminished and ‘the intensity of 
job search activity and motivation of job seekers 
decline[d]’ (DEWRSB, 2001, p. 62). The OECD 
reported that less than half of IA participants ‘had 
been sent to a job interview or to speak with an 
employer about a job’ (OECD, 2001, p. 193) and 
nearly a quarter of those surveyed had ‘visited their 
provider only once or twice’ (OECD, 2001, p. 59). 
It concluded that ‘few providers appeared to be 
offering effective services to address the underlying 
barriers to employment’ of the hardest to place 
(OECD, 2001, p. 193). There was little expenditure 
on employment subsidies or on vocational training.
The Productivity Commission reported that 
only 15 per cent of participants that JN members 
moved into employment resulted in payment of 
a 13-week outcome payment. Providers were 
instead deriving 70 per cent of their income from 
the ‘high level of commencement fees’ and there 
was little incentive for them ‘to achieve additional 
outcomes’ (PC, 2002, p. xxxiv). Critics argued that 
the funding incentives and the lack of regulation 
encouraged providers to take the upfront fee, work 
with the most job ready and ‘park’ the hardest 
to place. The OECD suggested that the complex 
interplay of eligibility rules, referral pathways and 
disparate programmes meant ‘there is a risk that 
signifi cant groups are falling through the gaps’ in 
provision (OECD, 2001, p. 93).
The Active Participation Model
The JN service delivery model was reshaped in 
2003. The Active Participation Model (APM) was 
designed to deliver a ‘service continuum’ that 
would ensure jobseekers ‘remain on the radar’ 
of a JN member at all times and are ‘actively 
engaged in job search, mutual obligation, or 
other authorised activity’ (ANAO, 2005b, p. 
29). DEWR emphasised the importance of the 
expected compliance effect of the APM in which 
participation requirements would themselves 
induce claimants to cease claiming income 
support (ANAO, 2005b, p. 33).
Jobseekers have been required to register 
with one JN member contracted to deliver initial 
registration, job placement and matching. After 
three months, participants who are ‘fully eligible’ 
for JN services enter ‘intensive support’. At this 
point the provider develops a Jobsearch Plan with 
the participant, who is required to undertake 100 
hours of jobsearch training. After fi ve months the 
JN member interviews the participant, who is then 
referred to a Community Work Co-ordinator to 
organise their mutual obligation placement, with 
the default option being WftD (the outcome for 
over 80 per cent of participants).
The most expensive provision – Intensive 
Support Customised Assistance (ISca) – is 
mandatory after a year of unemployment or earlier 
if the person is ‘highly disadvantaged’. Unlike the 
previous, less regulated IA phase, ISca requires 
fortnightly contact with a case manager who 
develops and monitors a back-to-work plan. This 
may include jobsearch and work preparation 
activities and, where appropriate, referral to training 
or rehabilitation services. To inject more intensity, 
the JN member must involve the participant in at 
least three days of structured activity a week for 
three months. The period of ISca was reduced to 
six months.
If a service user fails to get a job during this 
period, they again are required to participate in 
a six-month period of mutual obligation activity 
during and after which the JN provider contacts 
them at least on a bi-monthly basis. A second 
period of ISca commences after 24 months. 
Once a person has completed two periods of 
ISca in their current unemployment spell, they are 
classifi ed as very long-term unemployed and are 
able to access some additional levels of support, 
such as a time-limited wage subsidy. If at this point 
it is determined that the participant is a ‘serial job 
avoider’, they are required to participate full-time 
(25 hours a week) in WftD.
The Jobseeker Account, the Service 
Guarantee and EA 3000
The APM introduced other changes, including 
the Jobseeker Account (JSKA). The Account 
comprised a restricted pool of funds earmarked for 
spending only on employment barrier reduction. 
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The highest amount is triggered for those entering 
ISca. The Account is not an individual entitlement 
and a provider can use it fl exibly across their 
caseload. They are not allowed, however, to retain 
any surplus as profi t. Although providers may 
spend the funds on a wide range of activities, 
all expenditure must be classifi ed and reported. 
DEWR subsequently issued progressively detailed 
guidance on what could be spent making the 
‘administration of the JSKA very complex’ (ANAO, 
2007, p. 18).
A new Service Guarantee was introduced, 
supplementing an earlier Code of Practice. 
Providers are now bound by their contract to 
comply with the Code and Service Guarantee. 
The Code is an ethical framework that outlines the 
principles that guide how providers are expected 
to deliver quality services. The Service Guarantee 
outlines to participants their rights and the services 
and quality they can expect (see Appendix 2).
A further change was the development of a 
new mandatory IT system – EA3000. Providers 
are required to use this system for recording their 
interactions with clients, making payments and 
utilising the JSKA. DEWR uses EA3000 to monitor 
and regulate jobseeker fl ows, and to communicate 
procedures, manuals and guidance to providers. 
The system is used also to exchange and update 
jobseeker information with Centrelink.
The Job Network (2003–09) and 
contract management
DEWR intended that the transition to the APM would 
be less disruptive than in the previous change and 
the impact on JN members at the point of transition 
was less dramatic. Sixty per cent of the market was 
‘rolled over’ with contracts given to incumbent JN 
members with a minimum level (3.5) of star ratings. 
The 40 per cent of the market that was open for 
competition was let on a fi xed price tender and 
bids were decided on comparative quality, including 
criteria such as previous experience and proposed 
service delivery strategies.
After contracts were awarded, the number 
of JN members declined to 109, with seven new 
entrants. The system now was supplemented 
by a larger number of licensed job placement 
organisations, including many private recruitment 
agencies, which were paid only for registering 
vacancies and fi lling them with eligible jobseekers 
(Thomas, 2007, p. 3).
The funding system for JN members combined 
specifi ed service fees, the Jobseeker Account and 
outcome payments, weighted towards diffi cult-
to-place jobseekers. Table 3 shows the outcome 
payments for the ISca participants. The redesign 
was intended to ensure that, for providers, there 
would be a greater emphasis on income earned 
from outcomes rather than service fees.
Table 3: Intensive support customised assistance: outcome payments, 2003–09
Benefi t claim duration Payment type Interim payment  Final payment (26 weeks)
 (A$) (13 weeks) (A$) (A$)
4–12 months  550 n/a
13–24 months Outcome 1,650 825
 Intermediate* 550 550
15–36 months or classifi ed 
‘highly disadvantaged’ Outcome 3,300 1,650
 Intermediate* 550 550
3 years or longer Outcome 4,400 2,200
 Intermediate* 1,100 1,100
*  Intermediate payments are made for various part-time job and full-time education/training outcomes that reduce 
substantially the income support payments received by the participant, usually by an average of at least 70 per cent.
Source: DEWR (2005, p. 144).
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The JN system was driven through three 
‘key performance indicators’. The star ratings 
measured the speed of placing and the success 
in getting disadvantaged participants into jobs. 
Contract managers separately monitored Key 
Performance Indicator 3, which assessed the 
quality of service and its delivery to contracted 
specifi cations.
The Audit Offi ce reviewed the transition to 
the APM and found that DEWR had not secured 
its ‘transition objectives’ (ANAO, 2005b, p. 18). 
There were signifi cant problems with the new IT 
system and the anticipated numbers of jobseekers 
referred by Centrelink failed to materialise. Within 
a short period this threatened provider viability and 
the turbulence was reduced only after ministers 
injected more advance payments for providers 
(NESA, 2008).
Subsequently, the Government decided 
that 2006–09 JN contracts would be awarded 
automatically to incumbent providers with a 
minimum level of star ratings. About 95 per cent of 
the business was given to existing providers. This 
provided certainty and continuity of services but 
gave little potential for new entrants to compete for 
business.
Competition among incumbent providers is 
maintained with the reallocation of market share 
at six-monthly performance reviews when DEWR 
awards and publishes star ratings. JN contracts 
give providers only an allocated market share 
rather than a guaranteed number of participants 
and this can be varied between a minimum of 
80 per cent and maximum of 120 per cent to 
accommodate jobseeker choice. This enables 
contract managers to move clients to more 
successful providers, subject to their contract 
capacity. Consistent poor performance can result 
in the loss of a contract. Day-to-day pressure is 
maintained by DEWR through comparative raw 
weekly statistical performance reports sent online 
so that providers can compare their results with 
others. Providers complain that these performance 
pressures ‘force them to make decisions about 
what may be best for the stars not necessarily 
what is best for the job seeker’ (JA, 2008, p. 17).
In 2007, 8 per cent of the market was removed 
from poor providers and put out to tender. Fifteen 
of the 77 organisations that tendered for the work 
were successful – 13 were current JN members 
and two were existing subcontractors. This 
process reduced the number of JN members to 99 
and continued the trend towards consolidation.
Job Network services
The Productivity Commission (PC, 2002) reported 
that one of the major gains from the JN came from 
the diversity of approaches developed by service 
providers. The outcomes-based funding model 
allowed providers to tailor services to different 
participants, provide continuity of support through 
case managers, test methods for motivating 
jobseekers and provide various post-placement 
services. This and other evaluations reported 
that JN providers developed new practices to 
identify and tackle individual employment barriers, 
from the simple provision of clothes or travel-to-
work expenses through to the development of 
new assessment tools, counselling in jobsearch 
techniques, rehabilitation and short, job-focused 
training. Providers cultivated relationships with 
specifi c employers and better performers practised 
‘reverse marketing’ where staff sought to ‘sell’ and 
place participants directly with employers (NESA 
and DEWRSB, 2001; DEWR, 2006).
A study of ‘high performing’ JN sites reported 
that their distinctive features included local 
management cultures focused on delivering ‘key 
performance indicators’, specialist staff working 
with employers and use of the JSKA to provide 
wage subsidies. ‘Employer incentive’ payments 
increased from around zero to almost 30 per 
cent of all JSKA expenditure by 2006. Typically, 
small payments were made to employers at the 
commencement of a job and larger payments 
were made at the three- and/or six-month marks, 
coinciding with outcome payments (DEWR, 2006, 
p. 34 and p. 35).
Other commentators have been more critical 
of service quality, pointing out that low-cost 
jobsearch assistance and motivational strategies 
are unlikely to reduce the employment barriers of 
the hardest to help. They emphasise also that JN 
providers may use employment subsidies to ‘buy’ 
outcome payments and that there is declining 
investment in training (Murray, 2006). About a 
quarter of ‘intensively supported’ participants 
receive JSKA-funded training but this includes 
jobsearch and motivation courses along with job-
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specifi c training. Training courses last about three 
days and cost just A$287 on average (Murray, 
2006. p. 34).
‘Micro-management’: the impact 
of the APM on service quality and 
providers
As the JN evolved, several providers were found to 
have developed imaginative practices that enabled 
them to secure outcome payments without placing 
participants in real employment. Such practices 
included, for example, ‘manufacturing jobs or 
recycling a succession of job seekers through 
the same job to get outcome payments’ (PC, 
2002, p. xxx). DEWR outlawed such practices 
and increased compliance monitoring. After 
2003, this reduction in ‘trust’ combined potently 
with the Department’s new policy objectives, to 
more directly ‘steer’ the actions of providers and 
enforce the jobsearch activities of participants. This 
reduced the fl exibility of the system and soured the 
relationship with providers (Carney, 2007; Thomas, 
2007; Horn, 2008).
The combined introduction of JSKA and 
EA3000, for example, gave DEWR greater 
transparency but injected more complexity into 
the system and created signifi cant administrative 
burdens for providers. These processes were 
further intensifi ed by a ‘rules-based’ compliance 
approach to contract management; a series 
of restrictive revisions on how JSKA funds 
could be spent; and the need to keep accurate 
records to demonstrate that the contracted 
service interventions were being delivered. 
Providers argued that the APM had created 
a more standardised and less fl exible service 
delivery system that did not adequately support 
disadvantaged jobseekers. By 2007, up to half 
their available service hours were being consumed 
in meeting administrative and compliance 
requirements. DEWR’s own administrative costs 
were now absorbing over 15 per cent of the total 
JN budget (Murray, 2006; JA, 2008; NESA, 2008).
A report from Catholic Social Services 
Australia, which drew on the experience of its 
CentaCare JN provider, suggested that some 
competitors had sacrifi ced service quality 
for outcome volume with the emergence of 
questionable practices including ‘treble outcome 
strategies … concealments, excessive wage 
subsidies and outcome buying’ (Murray, 2006, 
p. 48). This distorted the measurement of 
provider performance, yet the results are built 
into the calculation of star ratings. This further 
disadvantaged those providers who exercised 
more care about job placement and sought to 
deliver high levels of interaction with jobseekers. 
The situation was exacerbated by a freeze in 
contract prices over successive years. The report 
estimated that cumulatively this reduced fi nancial 
viability by at least 25 per cent. It was also 
critical of what it called a strongly risk-averse and 
controlling culture within DEWR.
These criticisms were echoed by the two main 
provider organisations, the National Employment 
Services Association and Jobs Australia. Both 
suggest deterioration in the relationship between 
DEWR and providers, and that the Department 
used its ‘purchasing power to silence dissent and 
debate about the system and its governance and 
management’ (JA, 2008, p. 3). Partnership based 
on collaborative relationships had been replaced 
by ‘command and control’, which ‘shut down the 
innovation and fl exibility that was sought from a 
new employment services system’ (NESA, 2008, 
p. 13).
DEWR dismissed these criticisms as self-
interested lobbying, stressing that the changes 
introduced continued to increase the effectiveness 
of the JN.
Evaluations of Job Network 
performance, impacts and costs
DEWR publishes regular performance and 
job placement data. The post-programme 
monitoring survey measures outcomes achieved 
by jobseekers three months after they exit labour 
market assistance. During the 12 months to end 
June 2007, over 645,600 job placements were 
recorded by JN members and job placement 
organisations. The results from regular post-
programme monitoring reports reveal lower 
outcomes for the most disadvantaged jobseekers 
(see Table 4).
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A longitudinal survey of a sample of those 
who had responded to the three-month survey 
found that, 16 months after receiving assistance, 
most ISca participants had sustained themselves 
in employment and there was a movement away 
from casual to permanent employment, with 
average earnings and hours worked also rising 
(DEWR, 2007). Over the period, 15 per cent of 
respondents who participated in ISca gained 
employment while 10 per cent lost employment, 
so there was only a small increase in the overall 
total entering employment.
The Productivity Commission (PC, 2002) and 
(Australian National Audit Offi ce ANAO, 2005b) 
have been critical of the ways in which the data 
on gross outcomes can be misleading in terms 
of measuring the performance, effi ciency and 
cost effectiveness of the JN. The ANAO points 
out, for example, that many of the jobs recorded 
are secured by individual jobseekers without the 
direct help of DEWR’s providers or may simply be 
‘attributable to external factors (such as economic 
trends)’ (2005b, p. 21).
DEWR has, however, undertaken other ‘net 
impact’ evaluations that have sought to determine 
the additional value created by JN interventions.
The fi rst such DEWR evaluation was criticised 
by the Productivity Commission, which showed the 
Department’s ‘evaluation methods overstate the 
benefi ts of the programme’. It noted that, while the 
aggregate cost of employment programmes had 
fallen by half, with no impact on unemployment, 
JN programmes ‘had small or uncertain effects 
on the job prospects of participants’ and their net 
impact on employment was ‘very modest’ (PC, 
2002, p. 5.1). The Productivity Commission did 
emphasise, however, that even small net impacts 
‘still produce valuable social and economic 
outcomes’ (PC, 2002, p. xxvii).
In 2006, DEWR published the results of a 
revised study of ‘net impacts’ that used a new 
methodology. In particular, it measured impacts 
from the point of commencement, giving a more 
accurate assessment of ‘treatment’ effects, rather 
than the ‘compliance’ effect generated where 
people leave income support prior to entry to a 
mandatory programme. DEWR concluded that the 
results in Table 5 suggest high impact levels ‘equal 
to or better than’ high performing international 
programmes (DEWR, 2006, p. 4). DEWR also 
recalculated earlier data and concluded that the 
net impact of IA/ISca had increased from 0.6 per 
cent in 2001, to 6.2 per cent in 2002, to 10.1 per 
cent in 2005.
DEWR assessments of the JN attribute this 
success to the performance pressure generated 
by star ratings and the pay for performance 
contracting regime. By 2005, services were being 
provided by a much reduced number of better 
managed agencies delivering service strategies 
that had been progressively refi ned on the basis 
of operational experience (Grubb, 2006). Other 
external factors were also signifi cant, especially 
the fact that, in many areas, JN members now 
Table 4: Employment outcomes: intensive support, Work for the Dole and participation support 
programme, 12 months to June 2007*
Programme Employed  Employed Unemployed Education and Jobseeker
 full-time (%) part-time+ (%) (%) training (%) exits
IS (jobsearch) 24 26.7 41.7 14.5 139,525
ISca 1 18.7 28 38.5 13.2 181,495
ISca 2 12.6 28.7 47.1 11.5 77,574
WftD 14.2 17.4 58.1 10.4 93,983
Personal support 
programme 6.6 10.3 38.4 6.9 29,021
*  Does not include those who have left the labour force or are in another form of DEWR assistance.
+  Part-time employment defi ned as less than 30 hours a week.
Source: DEWR (2007, Tables 1.1 and 1.2).
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operated in conditions of near full employment.
The other much publicised success of the JN 
has been to drive down costs. DEWR offi cials 
frequently emphasise raw data on costs that 
indicate that, between 1991 and 1994, the cost 
per employment outcome was around $8,000, 
rising to just under $16,000 in 1995–96. These 
costs fell to $6,500 in the fi rst phase of the JN, 
and then to $3,500 by 2005, refl ecting in part the 
falling real values of fees and outcome payments 
after 2003. One signifi cant question was the extent 
to which these effi ciencies were, as many Job 
Network members suggested, secured at the price 
of weakened service quality.
Service user choice
One justifi cation for the creation of the JN was 
to improve services for participants and to 
introduce an element of ‘customer choice’ into 
the system. A survey of over 3,000 jobseekers in 
2002 (DEWR, 2002) found that many were ‘still 
unclear about their right to choose a provider’ and 
‘found the process daunting’. Some 76 per cent 
recalled being told they could make a choice but 
were provided with ‘minimal information about 
providers’ and three-quarters of them wanted 
‘a better description of what was on offer’. A 
signifi cant minority believed they had not been 
given a choice. Just over 70 per cent had chosen 
a provider. Forty-fi ve per cent had done so on the 
basis of convenient location, but 22 per cent had 
done so because of previous dealings with the 
provider or because of its reputation. The report 
cited other research fi ndings indicating that users 
‘may not exercise their right to choose because of 
confusion rather than a conscious decision not to 
choose’ (DEWR, 2002, pp. 1–7). This information 
gap was supposed to be fi lled by the newly 
introduced star ratings.
The Productivity Commission found, however, 
that at the stage of its inquiry user awareness 
of star ratings was low (PC, 2002). It suggested 
that choice did not operate effectively because 
participants did not get the appropriate information 
and providers had no incentive to seek out 
participants because of the recruitment limits 
in their contracts. They recommended that 
more user-driven competition could be injected 
if participants were given more service and 
performance information, and if the contractual 
limits on recruitment were removed.
Subsequently, the ANAO reported that, 
in a detailed review of four Centrelink offi ces, 
the ‘provision of information [at] seminars was 
variable, often poor, and did not meet minimum 
requirements’ (ANAO, 2005a, p. 21). Jobseekers 
were not given suffi cient information about local 
providers to enable them to make an informed 
choice and, in a signifi cant number of cases, 
individuals had to choose a provider before being 
advised of their rights in selecting a JN member 
(ANAO, 2005a, p. 120).
The signifi cance of this initial choice increased 
in importance after 2003 when participants were 
restricted to one provider only and could change 
only in limited circumstances. A participant 
normally is required to re-register with the same 
provider if they re-enter the system within 12 
months. Dissatisfi ed service users have access 
only to the formal complaints and redress system.
Table 5: Net impacts of the Job Network
JN programme Participants  Employment outcomes Employment net impacts
 (2004–05) (3 months) (%) (February 2005) (%)
Jobsearch training (support) 144,300 55 11.2
Customised assistance/
intensive support 298,100 45.8 10.1
Work for the Dole 81,900 32.3 7.3
Mutual obligation 148,000 Not given 8.2
Source: DEWR (2006).
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Complaints and customer 
satisfaction with the Job Network
Each JN site is contractually required to display 
information about how to make complaints and 
to maintain a ‘complaints register’ that DEWR can 
monitor. The ANAO found, however, that practices 
and policies of different JN members varied and 
that the registers could not ‘be regarded as a 
reliable record of job seeker complaints and 
of the response to those complaints’ (ANAO, 
2005a, p. 102). The ANAO reported also that 
‘user awareness of the Code of Practice, Service 
Guarantee and associated complaints mechanism 
remains very low’ (ANAO, 2005a, p. 15). It 
suggested that these weaknesses restricted 
DEWR’s insight into potentially systemic problems 
with service delivery.
The service user is expected in most 
circumstances to resolve any complaints with their 
provider but DEWR has its own ‘customer service 
line’, which can be used to make complaints. In 
a six-month period in 2008 the line received a 
total of 17,664 enquiries, of which 9,700 were 
registered as complaints. When senior offi cials 
were questioned, they had little knowledge of 
the outcomes of these complaints apart from 
suggesting some were resolved by the phone call 
itself (Senate Estimates, 2008, p. 16).
Complaints about JN services in practice 
are handled by several different organisations, 
including an independent ombudsman, Centrelink, 
as well as DEWR and individual JN members. 
They all have their own processes for recording 
and responding to complaints, but there is no 
comprehensive assessment. The ombudsman 
has pointed out that the complex policy, service 
and contractual arrangements through which 
JN services are delivered and participation 
requirements are met make it diffi cult for an 
individual to resolve issues they wish to challenge 
(CO, 2007, p. 40).
On a wider level, DEWR assesses the delivery 
of its service commitments through satisfaction 
surveys. The data is used by DEWR for ‘policy 
development and reporting’ and ‘high-level results’ 
shared with Centrelink (CO, 2007, p. 20). Unlike 
Great Britain, the results are not available publicly, 
with only headline statistics cited by Australian 
offi cials. The ANAO found that, while JN members 
were aware of DEWR’s satisfaction surveys, ‘they 
had not seen results … that related specifi cally to 
them, or to providers like them’ (ANAO, 2005a, p. 
109). Only one JN member had conducted their 
own client satisfaction survey, ‘some time ago’.
The sparse information available suggests high 
levels of satisfaction with JN services (regularly 80 
per cent plus), especially for those who participate 
in ISca. Basic job matching attracts lower ratings. 
In contrast, results released after the recent 
change of government suggested almost a quarter 
of jobseekers were not satisfi ed with JN services 
‘because the service was limited, infl exible or 
unresponsive to their needs’ (DEEWR, 2008, p. 7).
There are several independent, smaller-scale 
studies of user experience. An ANAO indicative 
sample of jobseekers found that levels of contact 
between JN members and participants ‘rarely 
met contractual specifi cations’, documentation 
on jobseekers’ barriers was limited and 
‘customisation’ of jobseekers’ Jobsearch Plans 
through the course of their time in ISca was very 
limited. This raised concerns about whether 
‘assistance is actually intensive and customised’ 
(ANAO, 2005a, p. 138).
The impact on non-profi t 
organisations
Non-profi ts play a major role in delivering the JN, 
providing about half the services available. The 
role of secular, community-based non-profi ts 
has declined, while that of church-based groups 
has increased. Two of the largest agencies are 
‘Employment Plus’ (the Salvation Army) and 
Mission Australia. Secular organisations tend to 
operate as smaller specialist providers, catering 
for particular client groups or localities. Their 
continuing role has been secured in particular 
by two innovative networks – Jobs Australia and 
Job Futures2 – that have emerged and, through 
pooling risk and providing expertise, have enabled 
remaining smaller non-profi ts to win and deliver JN 
contracts.
Many non-profi ts that delivered programmes 
before 1998 failed to win or have lost JN 
contracts. Some reappeared as subcontractors. 
Offi cials suggest this change removed less 
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effective providers and the successful non-profi ts 
have become more effi cient and ‘businesslike’. 
Others perceive a loss of important community 
resources and social capital, with negative impacts 
on disadvantaged communities (Abelló and 
MacDonald, 2002).
There has been much critical comment about 
the impact of non-profi t involvement in the Job 
Network on their social objectives. Some suggest 
their involvement has provided legitimation for 
neo-liberal welfare and employment policies that 
have worsened the living standards of the poor 
(Rapson, 2006). Others suggest that, even within 
a competitive environment, non-profi ts remained 
committed to providing more intensive services 
and sought to minimise the impacts of otherwise 
harsh policies (Eardley, 2003; Murray, 2006). The 
limited evidence available suggests that non-profi ts 
have higher staff to caseload ratios, that relatively 
lower numbers of clients are sanctioned and that 
they place more participants in ‘interim’ outcomes, 
such as education (DEWR, 2006, p. 31; Thomas, 
2007, p. 27).
The most contentious relationship with DEWR 
concerned the imposition of sanctions, with the 
dilemma of non-profi ts increasing as participation 
requirements were more rigorously enforced. Non-
profi ts lobbied against such changes and sought 
to mitigate their effects. For one commentator, 
this meant non-profi t involvement became a 
‘trojan horse’ and their criticism of and resistance 
to sanctions weakened the implementation of 
government policy. Many of these providers were 
now reliant on JN funding to support their other 
activities but their continued involvement in delivery 
undermined ‘the compliance regime at the same 
time as they compromise[d] their own principles’ 
(Saunders, 2008, p. 29).
Another serious, if less tangible, consequence 
of involvement in a competitive market has been 
a perceived negative impact on high levels of 
collaboration and co-operation that previously 
characterised relationships between non-profi ts 
delivering such services (Eardley, 2003).
‘A fresh approach’: the Labor 
Government’s new employment 
services model
In November 2007, Labor defeated the Coalition 
parties. The new Government was committed to 
a review of the JN and to an expansion of training 
opportunities. In May 2008, it outlined its reform 
proposals for the employment services system to 
commence in 2009 (DEEWR, 2008).
Centrelink will use a revised JSCI to categorise 
service users into one of four ‘streams’ (see 
Appendix 3 for more detail). Each service user will 
develop an Employment Pathway Plan with their 
provider and a new more fl exible Employment 
Pathway Fund will replace the JSKA. The level 
of resources for each participant, and outcome 
incentive for providers, will increase in relation 
to the stream to which they are referred. On 
completion of a stream, after 12 or 18 months, 
the user may be reassessed and moved to 
another stream, or required to participate in 
WftD or another work experience activity. Skills 
assessments and referral to training programmes 
are a new element of proposed provision. If 
participants are referred to accredited training 
and complete it, JN members will be paid a 20 
per cent bonus for placing them into subsequent 
employment.
The new system seeks to improve the position 
of service users by giving them greater involvement 
in the design of their ‘pathway to employment’ 
and by allowing them to change provider 
during a ‘cooling off period’. The Government is 
considering ways of incorporating user feedback 
into the performance management system.
Outcome payments will be weighted to better 
reward those providers who directly source 
vacancies from employers. The intention is to 
reduce the possibility for providers to maintain 
viability largely on the basis of service fees and 
the outcomes from participants who fi nd their 
own employment. Providers will be required to 
set out their strategies to engage with and assist 
employers, especially smaller ones. There will be 
only one reallocation of business over the lifetime 
of the contract.
The new system will integrate seven funding 
streams, which were previously contracted 
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separately, saving an anticipated A$350 million. 
All providers will, on their own or in partnership, 
be required to provide all four streams and access 
to work experience. A new Charter of Contract 
Management will be developed, performance 
management simplifi ed, administrative burdens 
reduced, the IT system re-engineered and the star 
rating system reviewed. Many of the details are 
subject to further consultation.
Other proposals signal an ambition to secure 
greater integration between the JN and other 
forms of service provision. These include additional 
funding for ‘employment brokers’ who will create 
closer co-ordination between JN members, 
training providers and individual employers. 
An ‘innovation fund’ will support employment-
focused partnership projects targeted at highly 
disadvantaged jobseekers in deprived areas.
Conclusion
The creation of the JN illustrates strengths and 
weaknesses of using market mechanisms to 
deliver employment services. DEWR created a 
viable network comprised of for-profi t and non-
profi t providers. The evidence suggests the JN 
delivers more outcomes for half the cost of the 
previous system. In this process, competition 
between providers and the outcome-related 
funding system has stimulated some innovation, 
and focused providers and their case managers 
on entry into sustained employment rather than on 
inputs and programme commencements.
As the system evolved, however, problems 
emerged with parking and creaming and the 
behaviour of some providers who used their 
fl exibility to manipulate the incentive system. 
As the system was adapted to minimise these 
negative consequences and meet new objectives, 
further problems emerged. Flexibility was reduced 
by greater administrative and compliance 
demands, and transaction costs increased. Micro-
regulation of providers, relative star ratings and the 
fall in value of fee and outcome payments drive 
providers to focus on the most ‘job ready’ and 
avoid more expensive but potentially longer-term 
solutions, such as vocational training. Jobseekers 
became largely passive recipients of JN services 
and unemployed people appeared to get little 
direct benefi t from the competitive part of the 
system.
The new Government accepts that the existing 
JN model is complex and ‘rigid’, and that existing 
incentives ‘skew’ provider behaviour towards 
short-term jobs. The proposed reforms seek to 
reshape the market to resolve these issues and 
meet new objectives, many of which are driven 
by the new Government’s ambition to increase 
the skills base of the Australian workforce. It will 
be interesting to review how well the reformed JN 
delivers following the implementation of the new 
arrangements in 2009.
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The Netherlands has two distinct systems of 
income support for working age people (see 
Appendix 4 for a description of the main working 
age benefi ts). An insurance system, funded 
mainly by employee and employer contributions, 
covers most people in regular employment. This 
provides relatively generous wage-related benefi ts 
to people who cannot work either because they 
are unemployed or because they have a long-term 
health problem or disability. A parallel municipal 
social assistance system provides a ‘safety net’ of 
means-tested income support for those who do 
not qualify for, or who exhaust, their insurance-
based entitlements.
The Netherlands has been reforming its social 
insurance and assistance systems since the 
late 1980s. The early stages of welfare reform 
coincided with economic recovery. Labour market 
participation increased from 60 per cent in 1983 
to more than 70 per cent in 1998 and there 
was frequent reference to a Dutch ‘employment 
miracle’ (Visser and Hemerijck, 1997). Relative 
success disguised the emergence of signifi cant 
problems including a marked increase in the 
number of people claiming disability benefi ts 
– reaching nearly a million by 2001; high rates 
of youth unemployment; persistent long-term 
unemployment; and more working age people 
claiming means-tested social assistance benefi ts.
Welfare reform efforts intensifi ed after the 
late 1990s with successive changes in disability 
benefi t entitlements and assessments, and reforms 
targeted at the unemployed and those claiming 
social assistance. There was major institutional 
change culminating in 2002 in the creation of 
the ‘reintegration market’ where municipalities 
and the social insurance agency (UWV) purchase 
reintegration services from private providers. The 
central Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment 
(SZW) does not act as a purchaser. Its aim has 
been to give the market ‘as much freedom as 
possible’ and keep government intervention ‘to a 
minimum’ (SZW, 2005, p. 54).
‘Reintegration’ services are targeted at 
all benefi t claimants subject to activation 
requirements, including those on disability benefi ts 
and lone parents. These services encompass 
case management, assessment, rehabilitation, 
vocational and/or jobsearch training, mandatory 
work experience, extended work trials, and job 
placement and retention services. In the market, 
the service packages are often organised and 
purchased as ‘trajectories’. Participants are 
assigned to more or less intensive trajectories 
on the basis of a profi ling system that assesses 
relative distance from the labour market. When 
a municipality or agency purchases what is 
called a full ‘reintegration trajectory’, this includes 
contracting out the case management service. 
Alternatively, in-house case managers in the UWV 
or municipalities may purchase individual service 
components as required.
The institutional framework of the 
reintegration market: the ‘chain of 
work and income’
The character of the Dutch reintegration market 
was developed through a sequence of reforms that 
culminated in the SUWI (Implementation Structure 
for Work and Income Act [2001]). The Act was 
designed to focus the system on ’work before 
income’ and to provide a clear implementation 
structure through the ‘chain of work and income’. 
The legislation requires the relevant institutions 
to co-operate in promoting the reintegration of 
service users.
Until the 1990s, benefi ts and employment 
assistance were delivered separately through a 
network of social insurance bodies, municipalities 
and the public employment service (PES). The 
Ministry funded PES employment programmes 
aimed at different target groups of benefi t 
recipients with separate regulations and reporting 
requirements. Municipalities were funded to deliver 
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sheltered workshops and some job creation 
programmes.
In the mid-1990s, the Government began to 
restructure the system ‘from sharing to earning’. 
Insurance funds and municipalities were given 
control of the budget for reintegration services, 
but were obliged to source 80 per cent of these 
services from the PES. New private operators had 
started to deliver some municipal programmes 
and the 20 per cent fl exibility saw further growth. 
Some municipalities restructured their own delivery 
agencies, often involving the formation of separate 
non-profi t entities (Sol and Hoogtanders, 2005).
The emergence of a growing sector of private 
temporary agencies in the regular market and 
the relative fl exibility and success of the private 
reintegration providers was contrasted with the 
expense, infl exibility and poorer results of the 
PES (Vink, 2002). Political pressure increased as 
purchasers sought more freedom and as private 
providers complained about unfair competition. 
In 2000, the PES was obliged to establish a clear 
internal division of responsibility for services and 
the obligation to purchase services from the PES 
was removed. This resulted in ‘a painful loss of 
market share’ for the PES (Sol, 2003, p. 208).
The other major delivery division of the PES, 
with responsibility for the nationwide network of 
front-line offi ces, was involved in a parallel reform 
process. The objective was to create a ‘one 
counter system’ comprised of a national network 
of ‘centres for work and income’ by the year 2000. 
These centres were to provide the platform for 
greater co-ordination and partnership working 
between the different components of the system.
In this context, the SUWI Act (2001) created 
new ‘autonomous administrative bodies’, 
somewhat similar to British executive agencies, 
which, with the municipalities, were to comprise 
the ‘chain of work and income’ (see Figure 1). The 
new bodies were the Central Organisation for Work 
and Income (CWI) and the Institute for Employee 
Benefi t Schemes (UWV). Both are controlled by 
a board of directors appointed by the Minister 
with no direct role for the social partners. Initially, 
the legislation required the insurance funds and 
municipalities to contract out their reintegration 
programmes, but, in 2006, municipalities were 
given autonomy in deciding whether to ‘make or 
buy’ such services.
The CWI and UWV
The SUWI legislation privatised PES reintegration 
and training services. The Government was the 
major shareholder of the new companies but the 
ambition was to secure a full market transition. The 
CWI took over the PES offi ce network and was 
responsible for the management and co-ordination 
of labour exchange services. The CWI had no 
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Figure 1: Service users and the Netherlands ‘chain of work and income’
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budget with which to purchase reintegration 
services.
The UWV co-ordinates and administers 
employee social insurance funds for sickness, 
disability and unemployment benefi ts. UWV staff 
assess the eligibility of applicants, administer 
insurance benefi ts and refer eligible claimants 
to reintegration services. The agency initially 
purchased reintegration services through 
conventional contracts. It issued tenders and 
entered contracts with reintegration providers, 
supervised their delivery and published the raw 
performance data on the companies with which it 
contracts (Schils, 2007).
In 2006, the Work and Income Employment 
Capacity Act radically reshaped the role of the 
UWV. Employers are now obliged to pay the 
wages of any sick or disabled employees for two 
years and are responsible for the reintegration of 
such employees within their company or in other 
employment (the ‘gatekeeper’ law). If the UWV 
fi nds that the employer has failed to discharge their 
reintegration responsibility, they may be required 
to continue paying the employee’s salary for a 
further year (OECD, 2007, p. 21). One aim of the 
legislation has been to stimulate a private market 
for reintegration services, purchased directly by 
employers or the private insurance companies with 
which they work. The consequence for the UWV 
has been a reduction of claimants entering the 
disability system from 100,000 to 20,000 a year 
(SZW, 2007, p. 52).
A further organisational change was announced 
towards the end of 2007. The UWV and CWI 
are to be merged in January 2009, integrating 
the delivery of employment services and social 
insurance benefi ts. The merger is accompanied by 
a budget reduction of €200 million to be realised 
by the end of a three-year process, with the loss 
of approximately 1,500 out of 21,000 jobs (EEO, 
2008). The changes are likely to induce turbulence 
in the quality of service delivery and impact on 
relationships with the municipalities.
The municipalities
The municipalities, of which there are over 450, 
make up the fi nal link of the ‘chain of work and 
income’. They deliver social assistance through 
their social services departments and case 
managers carry out assessments and channel 
eligible participants into employment assistance. 
The SUWI legislation required municipalities to 
move towards contracting out up to 70 per cent of 
their reintegration services and to introduce open 
tendering procedures.
The Work and Income Act (2003) introduced 
a new funding system. The Fund for Work and 
Income has two components. The ‘income 
fund’ pays for means-tested assistance and is 
determined on the basis of economic and social 
indicators. A separate fl exible ‘work fund’ is 
designed to pay for employment or reintegration 
services and can be used only to pay for such 
services. Any surplus in the ‘work fund’ is returned 
to the Ministry. By contrast, if the municipality pays 
less than it is allocated in the ‘income fund’, it can 
use the surplus as it sees fi t. The risk is that, if it 
overspends on benefi ts, it has to subsidise these 
payments from its own resources. The municipality 
thus has a powerful incentive to reduce the 
number of people claiming social assistance and 
many have done so through the introduction of 
what are called ‘work fi rst’ programmes. In 2006, 
the total central government allocation for ‘income’ 
amounted to €4.3 billion; the total allocated to 
‘work’ was €1.7 billion (SZW, 2005, p. 46).
In effect, municipalities act as ‘prime 
contractors’ and with devolved budgets are 
expected to manage local supply chains, provide 
employment services and purchase ‘trajectories’ 
from private companies.
The role of the Ministry
The Ministry’s overarching responsibilities are 
to increase the employment rate and to ensure 
that the labour market is functioning effectively 
(Morrell and Branosky, 2005). It is responsible 
for policy development, funding social security 
benefi ts and reintegration services and sustaining 
a ‘properly functioning reintegration market’. It sets 
the contracting framework, monitors trends and 
scrutinises the market to ensure it meets legislative 
objectives including, among other things, suffi cient 
competition, transparency and open tender 
procedures.
The Ministry directs the system through a 
national framework of policy objectives, annual 
performance targets and reviews. The annual 
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cycle of policy direction from the Ministry and 
feedback from the funding bodies and services on 
the ground is referred to as the ‘4R-model’ (SZW, 
2005).
A major source of insight into the system is 
provided by the Inspection Service for Work and 
Income (IWI). IWI is responsible for supervising 
the effective, effi cient and legal spending of public 
funds. It undertakes regular assessments and 
more detailed investigations, the results of which 
are presented to Parliament and made public.
Another source of insight is provided by 
the Council for Work and Income (RWI). This 
advisory body is the only platform for the social 
partners, who each, with municipalities, have fi ve 
representatives on the council. The RWI makes 
recommendations to the Minister on the design 
and delivery of the system and, through its full-
time secretariat, can undertake some independent 
research and analysis.
The voice of users
The SUWI legislation was motivated by concerns 
over effi ciency and effectiveness, but legislators 
were concerned also to protect the interests of 
users. One important principle was that services 
should be tailored to the user’s needs and the 
participant should have ‘freedom of choice’, 
subject to the objective of moving into employment 
(SZW, 2003). In particular, there was provision that 
users should be actively engaged in the analysis 
of the barriers they faced and that their opinion 
should be sought on important issues, such as the 
selection of a reintegration agency.
All of the organisations and providers in the 
‘chain of work and income’ are required also to 
respect user privacy and confi dentiality, and to act 
on complaints. The agencies, and most providers, 
undertake customer satisfaction surveys, 
although the practice appears less common in the 
municipalities.
The CWI and UWV had to establish regional 
and national client councils. These feed into a 
National Client Council, which represents the 
voice of service users, engages in dialogue with 
the Minister and the other bodies, and can play 
a challenge role. The councils are composed of 
service users or representatives nominated by 
advocacy and user organisations. While they 
give a voice to users, the formal role is of a junior, 
refl ected in the fact that the National Council has 
only one full-time staff member located in the same 
building as the RWI but with no seat on the more 
powerful Advisory Council.
Service users have a well developed right 
of administrative appeal within the insurance-
based and social services system and, if 
unsuccessful, they can appeal to a judge. In 
these circumstances, they may have access 
to free legal aid and to a social council that will 
provide advice and support. Service users who 
cannot resolve other issues directly with the main 
agencies or reintegration companies can make 
representations through the Client Councils or 
through their elected representatives. In a case 
of maladministration, they may have recourse to 
an independent ombudsman who can investigate 
public sector bodies but has no jurisdiction over 
private reintegration companies.
Transparency in the reintegration 
market
While central government adopted a ‘hands-off’ 
approach to market development, there were 
concerns about the absence of information that 
could inform purchasers and users about the 
quality and performance of providers. In the 
absence of a public benchmark, the association 
of providers, Borea, developed its own ‘quality 
mark’ (keurmerk) for its affi liated companies. 
Borea was created in 2000 and by 2007, when it 
became Boaborea, had 150 member companies 
responsible for delivering more than half of the 
market.
The quality benchmark was launched in 2002. 
It comprises 13 performance indicators related 
to effi ciency and speed in organising services, 
results, staff competences and development, 
customer satisfaction, privacy and complaint 
handling (Morrell and Branosky, 2005, pp. 96–7). 
The results are independently audited for each 
company twice a year. Any company failing on an 
indicator has to put an improvement plan in place 
and a second failure results in withdrawal of the 
quality mark. The quality mark became infl uential in 
contract-awarding processes but was not offi cially 
endorsed.
29The reintegration market in the Netherlands
In the wake of continuing criticism, the SZW 
Minister encouraged the formation of a new 
foundation, established in 2005, which brought 
together the relevant organisations, including 
Boaborea and the Client Council, and was chaired 
and supported by the RWI. The foundation is 
charged with increasing insight into the quality 
and performance of the market and for developing 
another quality mark, building on the work of 
Boaborea, and publishing regular results.
The service user journey in the 
chain of work and income
Unemployed people must register for work with 
the CWI before claiming benefi t from UWV or a 
municipality. About half of the CWI offi ces share 
premises with both the UWV and a municipality. 
Other offi ces have UWV services available on site 
but the municipality delivers its services from a 
different location. When the CWI and UWV are 
merged in 2009, there will be offi ce rationalisation. 
Larger regional offi ces will offer a ‘full service’ with 
municipal involvement and smaller offi ces will offer 
a more basic service.
The CWI operates a ‘work before income’ 
strategy and service users are expected to focus 
their initial attention on fi nding work, with or 
without the help of CWI staff. All jobseekers may 
use self-service facilities at the CWI or over the 
internet, which provides a virtual labour market 
that is used by employers and temporary work 
agencies. The CWI remains responsible for 
assisting and monitoring the jobsearch activities of 
the most employable service users for the fi rst six 
months of unemployment.
Front-line CWI staff undertake a formal 
assessment of the claimant before a claim for 
benefi t. The assessment includes use of a profi ling 
instrument to judge level of disadvantage and 
appropriate support. The original ‘four-phase’ 
classifi cation model, the ‘Kansmeter’, allocated 
users into four phases, with phase 1 being closest 
to the labour market. Each category indicated 
the speed at which users would be referred to 
the UWV or municipality and signalled the type 
and cost of employment support for which they 
would be eligible. After implementation, the model 
was criticised for its poor predictive powers, often 
caused by key factors not being identifi ed at the 
CWI assessment. The purchasing agencies and 
their providers often would have to undertake their 
own subsequent assessments.
By 2007, the ‘Kansmeter’ had been replaced 
by a simpler two-phase system based on the 
capacity for independent jobsearch. Those users 
categorised as ‘A’ were ‘immediately employable’ 
and those classifi ed as ‘B’ were in ‘need of further 
preparation for work’ and referral to UWV or the 
municipality. This was designed to avoid immediate 
categorisation and give more fl exibility to an 
adviser to reassess a user if they encountered 
barriers in their search for work.
The UWV and municipalities pay benefi ts and 
provide reintegration services. After 12 months’ 
unemployment, or six months in the case of 
people aged under 25, both agencies were 
responsible for delivering a reintegration service as 
part of a ‘comprehensive approach’ (OECD, 2006). 
The level and intensity of any reintegration activity 
is determined by either a municipal case manager 
or a UWV offi cial.
After the SUWI reforms, there were criticisms 
of the lack of fl exibility for participants and the 
poor quality of reintegration support provided by 
UWV staff. The organisation had introduced case 
managers in 2002 but they had little capacity to 
tailor reintegration services outside of the contracts 
agreed with providers. The pressure for more 
fl exibility culminated in 2005 with the introduction 
of ‘reintegration coaches’, empowered to design 
and provide more tailored support, and to 
purchase group or individual service elements 
outside of the regular contracts. About 600 
reintegration coaches were operating by 2007 
(Desczka, 2007a).
The reintegration coach is usually located in 
the CWI offi ce and has more fl exibility in deciding 
what support to make available. This will normally 
include the use of formal assessment systems 
followed by an action plan, which the user 
undertakes to follow and which indicates the 
services the coach has agreed to provide. This 
may consist of selected service options, such as 
a work trial, or complete reintegration trajectories, 
both of which will be purchased from the private 
sector. During this process a user may seek to opt 
for an Individual Reintegration Agreement (IRO).
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After entering reintegration services, the 
participant is expected to attend as required, 
which may be for several hours a day on most, 
and sometimes all, days of the week. In the case 
of a full trajectory, the provider is likely to focus 
initially on assessing need, improving basic skills 
and confi dence, and support with jobsearch 
techniques. Subsequently, there may be periods of 
short-term or temporary employment or voluntary 
work, language training or even more formal skills 
enhancement through occupational training. These 
preparatory activities will be followed by more 
intensive jobsearch and placement support. The 
average duration of such trajectories is about a 
year.
During the trajectory, the reintegration coach 
will be sent reports and is expected to monitor 
progress and make any necessary adjustments 
after discussion with the user. If the user is thought 
not to be engaging with the process, they may 
be sanctioned by the coach and their benefi t 
reduced until compliance is secured. They will 
be sanctioned also for non-attendance. Typically, 
this will involve a 10 per cent or 20 per cent 
benefi t reduction for a specifi ed period, the length 
determined by the nature of the non-compliance 
and whether earlier sanctions have been imposed.
The transfer of an individual from the CWI 
to a municipal case manager may happen 
immediately or within the fi rst year depending 
on local policies (Desczka, 2007b). Municipal 
case managers have discretion about the type of 
employment assistance or reintegration services 
they provide. They also have the power to impose 
sanctions for non-attendance or compliance with 
requirements. Reintegration services available vary 
widely and may include referral to full reintegration 
trajectories, individual service elements, subsidised 
employment, social activation or, for some, 
placement in sheltered workshops.
Chain management and ‘joined up’ 
service delivery
One of the aims of the new system was for CWI, 
UWV and the municipalities to ‘join up’ service 
delivery. The ambition was to create shared offi ces, 
to encourage ‘warm handovers’ and to develop 
common IT systems. The delivery organisations 
work together through service level agreements 
and joint performance indicators.
The process of organisational change that 
followed SUWI encountered implementation 
problems, especially in co-ordinating information 
fl ows and the ‘handover’ of service users between 
the respective parts of the delivery chain. The 
creation of ‘shared premises’ proceeded more 
slowly than anticipated, as did the development of 
common IT systems. The respective organisations 
were focused initially on internal changes and 
the redesign of work processes. There was also 
tension between them. One analysis suggests 
implementation problems were exacerbated by 
‘distrust’. As ‘a result the question of who was 
responsible for what seemed to be more important 
than aspects of the information exchange or the 
infrastructure itself’ (Bekkers et al., 2006, p. 95). 
The system was characterised by a ‘high density 
of all kinds of consultation structures on the 
political-administrative, operational and information 
management level’ (Bekkers et al, 2006, p. 97). 
Further organisational turbulence is expected after 
the CWI and UWV are merged in January 2009.
The reintegration market
There are three separate types of purchaser 
in the Netherlands market. The largest single 
purchaser is the UWV, which procures services 
for the unemployed and those on disability 
benefi ts. Municipalities ‘make or buy’ reintegration 
services for social assistance claimants and fund 
subsidised employment and sheltered workshops. 
Employers and their private insurers procure 
rehabilitation and occupational health services and, 
following the 2006 legislative changes, directly 
purchase reintegration services.
The composition of public expenditure on 
purchasing employment services has responded 
to policy change. Table 6 illustrates that the overall 
budget declined between 2002 and 2005, from 
€2.2 billion to €1.89 billion. UWV spending on 
reintegration increased slightly in response to 
increased unemployment. The most signifi cant 
change was the reduction in the municipal budget 
for subsidised employment and the increase in 
the amount allocated to reintegration services. 
There is no clear breakdown of the proportion of 
the reintegration budget contracted out to private 
providers.
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One estimate suggests that, between 2002 
and 2006, about 150,000 people participated in 
reintegration services each year. The majority, 60 
per cent, were handled by the municipalities, with 
the UWV providing contracted out services for the 
unemployed and those on disability benefi ts (Sol, 
2008, p. 76).
Reintegration companies vary in size and 
composition. A detailed analysis from 2004 
reported that there were 663 providers, of which 
232 provided reintegration services, 373 provided 
medical interventions and 58 were training 
institutions. Many were small, with 60 per cent 
employing less than ten staff; nearly a quarter 
employed less than a hundred; and less than 
one in fi ve had more than a hundred employees. 
Of the 232 reintegration service providers, only 
47 had contracts with the UWV. At that time, ten 
reintegration providers were responsible for 75 per 
cent of UWV reintegration programmes (OECD, 
2006, para. 114).
The larger organisations are often involved 
in both national and multiple local contracts, 
and some deliver similar employment services 
in other countries.1 They include several private 
recruitment agencies, the ‘reinvented’ delivery 
arms of older social insurance agencies and for-
profi t companies that have developed within the 
market (de Koning, 2007). These organisations 
may act also as subcontractors for each other. Kliq 
NV, the privatised arm of the PES, initially was a 
major provider with 2,000 employees. It struggled 
in the new market and failed to attain the 50 per 
cent market share it anticipated. By 2003, it was 
in fi nancial diffi culty and, in 2005, it was declared 
bankrupt (Europa, 2006).
Municipalities often contract with local 
organisations from the non-profi t sector, although 
for-profi t companies will deliver reintegration 
contracts for the larger municipalities. The non-
profi t sector is composed of organisations created 
by municipalities to deliver programmes, especially 
subsidised employment and sheltered workshops. 
There is little direct involvement from the type of 
voluntary and third-sector organisations that play a 
more important role in Australia and the UK.
The UWV market: from tenders to 
IROs
The UWV has been at the forefront of developing 
the reintegration market. During the 1990s, social 
insurance agencies began to contract with private 
providers but the fi rst major tender was issued 
in 2000. Subsequently the UWV, the largest sole 
purchaser, organised seven ‘tender rounds’ 
between 2002 and 2007, with the annual number 
of trajectories involved falling from the 60,000 
purchased in each of the fi rst two years to some 
40,000 by 2006. Each tender invited providers 
to submit bids to deliver batches of trajectories 
and services targeted at particular client groups, 
sectors and regions.
The UWV continuously adapted the way in 
which it designed tenders and managed contracts. 
The initial tenders, for example, incurred high 
Table 6: Netherlands public expenditure on employment services, 2002–05
 2002 (€m) 2005 (€m)
Total UWV reintegration 270 279
Disabled 222 199
Unemployed 48 80
Total municipalities 1,958 1,611
Subsidised employment 1,525 841
Reintegration trajectories 433 770
Total employment services 2,228 1,890
Of which reintegration/matching 703 1,049
Source: Sol (2006).
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transaction costs for both the UWV and providers, 
and problems were experienced in producing and 
assessing high numbers of submitted tenders in 
short periods (Sol, 2003, p. 212). Subsequent 
changes sought to reduce administrative burdens, 
create more stability and increase the emphasis on 
‘pay for performance’.
Throughout the period, there were some 
common elements in how tenders were awarded 
and delivered. When bidding for a contract, a 
provider must indicate the average costs for a 
trajectory and the proportion of participants they 
will get into sustained employment, with minimum 
job placement rates specifi ed by the purchaser. 
The UWV has not stipulated ‘fl oor prices’ or 
fee levels, as happened in Australia. The bidder 
makes their own judgements about the costs of 
trajectories and the performance levels they would 
attain and the purchaser has then been able to 
decide which bid they would choose.
Bids are assessed by UWV staff on a 
combination of criteria, in particular quality 
of provision, placement percentage offered, 
anticipated drop-out rates, price and past 
performance (OECD, 2006). These latter two 
indicators assumed growing importance as costs 
increased and providers developed ‘track records’. 
Many argue that priority was given to the lowest 
price bidders, rather than decisions being made on 
quality, which resulted in cost pressures on service 
quality (Struyven and Steurs, 2005; Sol, 2008).
Contracts were typically awarded for one 
year until 2004 when the UWV awarded two-year 
contracts for some target groups and introduced 
the possibility of contract extensions for high-
performing providers. These changes covered 
about a third of the trajectories put out to tender.
A UWV contract does not guarantee a 
minimum number of referrals for a provider. Actual 
recruitment has depended on the discretion of 
the UWV case manager and, to some extent, the 
choice of the service user. This acts as a safeguard 
against ‘creaming’. In certain circumstances, the 
provider can refer the service user back to the 
UWV if the individual has been wrongly assessed 
or is judged unsuitable, but it has been rare for 
them to refuse to enrol a participant (Struyven and 
Steurs, 2005).
A successful contractor is responsible for 
the complete management of the reintegration 
process. Although they have considerable freedom 
to design services, they must meet minimum 
requirements. The most important for the service 
user is the production of an individual action 
plan that must be agreed by UWV. The action 
plan includes a diagnosis of the participant’s 
circumstances, the intensive employment 
activity they will be placed in and when this will 
commence. The provider has eight weeks within 
which to produce the plan with the service user. 
The intensive activities may consist of a wide range 
of single or combined options including unpaid 
work experience, language training, intensive 
jobsearch and occupational training. Individual 
elements may be delivered by subcontractors. The 
provider is expected to deliver jobsearch support 
and, when an individual gets employment, up to 
six months’ post-job-placement support.
Once the contract has commenced, the 
provider can recruit a participant for up to a year 
and delivery of a complete trajectory may take 
up to two years. One consequence has been 
that overall job placement results from particular 
contracts may not be known for up to three years 
from the point of commencement.
The primary aim of UWV contracts has been 
to reward providers for placing participants in 
sustained employment. In the fi rst phase of 
contracts, the key principle was that of ‘no cure, 
less pay’, which meant that the provider would not 
recover the full anticipated cost of the trajectory 
they had given in their bid unless they placed 
someone into a sustained employment outcome. 
The job entry fee is paid usually after two months 
in employment where the participant has a 
minimum six-month job contract and the payment 
may be higher for an indefi nite contract (Struyven 
and Steurs, 2005). In the early period, there was a 
separate budget for vocational training that could 
be claimed outside of the contract. This budget 
was subsequently removed and training was 
available only at the discretion of the provider.
Other contract clauses were designed to 
provide incentives that encouraged providers to 
exceed the job entry rates they committed to, and 
to do so quickly. These incentives vary with the 
barriers faced by particular client groups.
After 2003, greater emphasis was placed 
on ‘payment by results’ with the introduction of 
‘no cure, no pay’ contracts for the relatively easy 
33The reintegration market in the Netherlands
to place. In 2004 this applied to about 40 per 
cent of the trajectories contracted for. The other 
trajectories continued to pay for services delivered 
and outcomes secured. Between 10 and 20 per 
cent of the price would be paid on completion of 
the action plan, a fi xed payment of about 40 per 
cent six months after commencement and another 
40 or 50 per cent after placement in a job for two 
months, with a minimum six-month contract (Sol, 
2008, p. 77).
The increased emphasis on performance 
funding was designed to secure faster placement 
into employment and was, in part, a response to 
the increased costs of trajectories. One estimate 
suggests that, between 1998 and 2002, the 
average cost per contracted trajectory increased 
from €3,500 under the former PES to €4,700, but 
had then fallen to between €2,500 and €3,000 by 
2007.2
The changes to the payment system helped 
drive down prices but reinforced criticisms of 
the contracting system. Boaborea, the RWI, the 
Client Council and others argued that the focus on 
short-term results to secure outcome payments 
had a negative impact on the quality of trajectories, 
with providers removing costly service elements, 
especially longer-term training (de Koning, 2007). 
In response to parliamentary pressure, the 
Government and UWV reintroduced an additional 
training budget in 2004.
UWV contracts have been designed to 
promote competition and reduce potential barriers 
to entry for new providers and portions of the 
budget in several tenders have been variously 
reserved for local providers, new entrants or 
innovative projects. Nevertheless, by 2004, 
provision was dominated by larger providers 
delivering standardised services and few new 
entrants were bidding in response to tenders 
(Morrell and Branosky, 2005). By that stage 
only 4 per cent of UWV provision was delivered 
by non-profi ts, which tended to be specialised 
organisations working with people on disability 
benefi ts (Sol, 2008, p. 75). Larger providers were 
better placed to absorb the high transaction costs 
involved in such a fragmented and volatile system. 
They enjoyed economies of scale, professional 
bid writing and administrative teams, and the 
accumulating advantages of incumbency and 
verifi able achievements in delivering contracts.
Individual Reintegration 
Agreements (IROs) and the 
‘purchase framework’
During the passage of the SUWI Act (2001), 
parliamentary representatives had pushed hard 
to ensure that the service user was placed at the 
heart of the reintegration process. As the UWV 
market developed, it became clear that, instead 
of client-focused innovation and specialisation, 
the tender system had induced a convergence 
towards standardised services. A 2004 report 
from IWI found also that 90 per cent of service 
users surveyed wanted a choice of trajectory, but 
only half of participants reported having some 
infl uence on the choice of provider. Nearly 80 per 
cent of those who reported exercising no choice 
would have preferred one. The report revealed 
also that the low cost of provision prevented 
individualisation and forced providers towards 
‘group reintegration’.3
In response to growing criticism, the UWV 
introduced IROs from January 2004. These 
allowed eligible service users to negotiate an 
individual plan with a provider of their choice, 
subject to agreement with the UWV, which 
subsequently enters a contract with the provider. 
The National Client Council played a major role 
in lobbying for IROs and for the introduction of a 
network of independent advisers now located in 
many CWI and ‘shared premises’ locations. The 
service user can now access advice on available 
providers from both the reintegration coach and 
the independent adviser, who has no role in 
decisions about the fi nal plan or about benefi ts. 
The service user is encouraged to select the 
services that will best help them obtain a job and 
the provider has more freedom to personalise the 
services offered.
An IRO trajectory can last for up to two 
years and the normal maximum price is €5,000. 
For users with more signifi cant barriers, the 
price may be up to €7,500 and, in exceptional 
circumstances, the UWV may increase this limit. 
The contract offers a ‘no cure, less pay’ funding 
formula and the provider is paid 20 per cent at 
the start of an agreed plan, 30 per cent after 
six months participation with 50 per cent of the 
agreed fee only paid if the participant enters 
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sustained employment. This formula may be varied 
with higher service fees for those most diffi cult to 
place.
The individual budget was more popular than 
expected and within months more users were 
opting for IROs than were participating in tendered 
trajectories. By the end of 2006, IROs accounted 
for some 30,000 of the 45,000 trajectories agreed 
that year and have since stabilised at about 60 
per cent of agreed trajectories (Sol, 2008, p. 74). 
The IRO led also to an infl ux of much smaller 
providers and the number of companies that UWV 
contracted with increased rapidly from less than 
100 in 2003 to 2,400 by 2007.4 About 1,900 of 
these delivered IROs only and some 1,600 were 
‘micro-providers’ who might be servicing only 
fi ve or ten participants. The provider registration 
requirements were minimal and there was concern 
about the quality of provision. The rapid increase in 
IROs also undermined the tender system. Larger 
providers who had incurred the costs of securing 
tenders saw recruitment fall and began to re-
engineer their processes to deliver IROs.
These developments led to a major overhaul of 
the UWV contracting system with the introduction 
in April 2008 of a ‘purchase framework’ for 
procuring modular reintegration services and 
IRO purchased integrated service packages 
(trajectories). Price competition and the tender 
system have been abandoned. The UWV now 
determines prices and providers have to meet 
specifi ed process and performance requirements 
to be placed on a UWV ‘approved list’. Many 
service users continue to have an IRO option 
through the mediation of a reintegration coach. 
Many of the less disadvantaged unemployed will 
not have access to an IRO but it continues to be 
the main reintegration route for those on disability 
benefi ts or those with complex barriers.
The municipal market: reintegration 
services and ‘work fi rst’
The ‘market’ for municipal reintegration services 
and employment programmes refl ects local 
conditions and caseloads. The municipalities of 
Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague and Utrecht 
have the largest budgets and more diverse case 
loads and supply chains. Many of the smaller 
municipalities are likely to purchase from a 
sole provider, or to join together to provide and 
purchase relevant employment services, or to 
purchase them from larger municipalities or their 
related agencies.
During the 1990s, municipalities increased 
the number of reintegration trajectories they 
purchased, especially after the transfer of PES 
funds, but the major part of their employment 
assistance budgets were absorbed by relatively 
high cost public and voluntary sector subsidised 
jobs for the most disadvantaged. Some 
of the employees in these subsidised jobs 
enjoyed permanent contracts. There were few 
incentives for either participants or providers to 
use subsidised jobs as a transition to regular 
employment. Municipalities have been responsible 
also for separately funded sheltered workshops 
organised for priority groups on different disability 
benefi ts. By 2002, it was estimated that there 
were 80,000 subsidised jobs and 90,000 users 
employed in workshops, costing some €3 billion 
annually (Vink, 2002, p.5). From the mid-1990s, 
the municipalities also introduced less costly 
‘social activation’ programmes for the hardest to 
help aimed at promoting inclusion through various 
forms of unpaid community work (van Berkel, 
2006).
Many of these employment programmes 
were delivered through special purpose non-
profi t agencies created by the municipalities. 
The status of these organisations as ‘preferred 
suppliers’ was, as with the PES, undermined by 
the SUWI requirement that municipalities contract 
out 70 per cent of their reintegration services and 
secure ‘value for money’ using transparent and 
verifi able tender procedures (SZW, 2005, p. 46). 
The non-profi t sector declined too as the budget 
for subsidised jobs was reduced and as the focus 
of sheltered workshops shifted to acting as a 
‘springboard’ to the regular labour market (van 
Berkel, 2006). In Amsterdam, for example, the 
share of reintegration expenditure delivered by 
non-profi ts fell from nearly 80 per cent in 1998 
to 15 per cent in 2003, while that of for-profi t 
organisations increased from just over 20 per cent 
to over 80 per cent (Sol and Hoogtanders, 2005).
After the SUWI legislation, municipalities 
enjoyed considerable freedom in designing their 
procurement strategies and, while infl uenced 
by UWV developments, followed no common 
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framework for contracting out services. Each 
developed its own tender process, procedures 
and contract requirements (Vink, 2003). Some 
purchased whole trajectories; others simply 
purchased individual service elements. There was 
a trend to performance-related contracting. In 
2004, it was reported that over 70 per cent of the 
municipalities had introduced some element of 
‘no cure, less pay’ contracting. Only 7 per cent of 
municipalities, however, made use of ‘no cure, no 
pay’ (SZW, 2005, p. 47).
This diversity of approach refl ected in 
part local labour market conditions and the 
characteristics of the resident social assistance 
recipients. It refl ected also bureaucratic capacity 
and the availability of local agencies, whether 
private or linked to the municipality, to implement 
programmes. Municipalities varied greatly in 
their administrative capacity to design tenders, 
assess bids and monitor effective delivery. Many 
took a highly cautious and prescriptive approach, 
and both they and the reintegration companies 
complained of the high transaction costs involved. 
An offi cial evaluation of SUWI found that, in 
some circumstances, the bureaucratic character 
of the process and the unrealistic, sometimes 
unreasonable, expectations of municipalities were 
‘obstructing’ market forces (SZW, 2005, p. 57). As 
with the UWV, municipalities have recently sought 
stability in provision either by awarding longer-
duration contracts or by awarding extensions to 
existing contracts subject to performance.
Variations in approach were not simply the 
product of implementation conditions or the 
characteristics of social assistance populations 
but also refl ected local policy priorities and the 
varied ways in which the political majorities in local 
councils analysed the problem to be tackled and 
the solutions to be implemented.
The evolution of the municipal market 
overlapped with the Work and Income Act (2004) 
that introduced the new ‘block grant’ funding 
system. The legislation removed many budgetary 
constraints on municipalities, including the 
requirement to provide reintegration services to all 
social assistance benefi ciaries after a year. It was 
assumed that the new funding mechanism would 
drive the municipalities to activate recipients.
Subsequently, the municipalities were 
successful in persuading the Government to 
remove the requirement that they contract out 
70 per cent of reintegration services. From 2006, 
they have been able to decide which parts of their 
local provision they wish ‘to make or buy’ either 
through in-house provision or through contracts 
with external providers. Reports from the RWI 
indicate that many municipalities have brought 
case management and initial assessment back in 
house and no longer contract out full trajectories. 
In common with the UWV, the municipalities 
still contract out reintegration services but have 
developed a ‘modular buying strategy’ where they 
purchase shorter-duration interventions whose 
results are easier to monitor and measure (Corra 
and Plantinga, 2008).
‘Work fi rst’ and ‘workfare’ in the 
municipalities
By 2006, 85 per cent of municipalities were 
developing what they described as ‘work 
fi rst’ approaches (van Geuns and van Gent, 
2007). These local strategies developed largely 
independently of each other and evolved through 
experience, with ‘policy innovation’ being 
‘generally a process of trial and error’ (Bunt et al., 
2008, p. 20).
Despite local variation in ‘work fi rst’ strategies, 
their common feature is the requirement that most 
social assistance recipients must be engaged in 
work or work-related activities immediately after 
they claim social assistance. Failure to comply 
results in sanctions or benefi t withdrawal.
‘Work fi rst’ interventions stress rapid job 
placement and are likely to include intensive 
supervision, short-term mandatory work, 
integrated services, case manager support, a 
time limit to activities and follow-up after job 
placement. Providers will have strong outcome 
incentives. These ‘work fi rst’ components are of 
short duration and relatively cheap. One study 
estimated they cost between €1,300 and €1,900 
per participant (cited in Bunt et al., 2008, p. 28).
These are supplemented often by mandatory 
work experience or ‘workfare’ for those harder to 
place in regular jobs. These may be delivered by 
non-profi t or for-profi t organisations. Contracts will 
reimburse more of the direct costs in fees, but with 
some outcome payments. In some municipalities, 
participants work in return for their benefi t 
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payments, others may be paid the minimum wage. 
The objective is both to deter those who could get 
regular work and to inculcate basic employability 
skills, such as timekeeping, adapting to work 
routines and so on. There is also likely to be 
some assistance with jobsearch and placement. 
According to municipalities, these mandatory 
employment services serve two different goals. 
They both minimise demands on social assistance 
through deterrence and maximise the outfl ow into 
work through employment assistance (Sol et al., 
2007).
All participants in reintegration and work 
programmes may receive additional support 
to remove barriers (such as debt counselling, 
childcare, transport, etc.). There is little provision 
of occupational training, which is made available 
only when linked to a defi nite vacancy (Bunt et al., 
2008).
There appears to be signifi cant variation 
in service user ‘voice and choice’ across 
municipalities. Some municipalities have ‘client 
councils’ but only a few are experimenting with 
their own version of an IRO (van Geuns and van 
Gent, 2007). In many areas there may be little 
real choice, given the small scale of provision. In 
others choice may be excluded by policy design. 
In Rotterdam, for example, four reintegration 
providers have a monopoly of provision in each 
quarter of the city. One study suggested that 
service user action plans had little fl exibility and 
there was ‘little actual negotiation between clients 
and service providers’ and that ‘clients have little 
power to ensure their needs, wishes and ambitions 
are taken seriously in the activation process’ (van 
Berkel, 2006, p. 29). There is no ‘readily available 
information on client satisfaction’ (Desczka, 2007b, 
p. 22).
Evaluations of the reintegration 
market
The SZW submits progress reports on the SUWI 
reforms and other legislation to Parliament several 
times a year. These cover general trends in 
employment and benefi t populations, the gross 
outcomes of programmes and UWV tenders, but 
focus mostly on implementation processes and 
the extent to which the principle of ‘work before 
income’ has been realised. One such report from 
2006 suggested that, while the fundamental 
architecture of SUWI had been put in place, there 
were a variety of problems around co-operation 
and information exchange within the delivery chain 
(cited by Desczka, 2007a). Another report in 2005 
expressed concern that the ‘client focus’ intended 
by the legislation was not being realised, given 
results from customer satisfaction surveys and 
complaints procedures. Progress had been made 
but the ‘client is still insuffi ciently central to the 
provision of services’ (SZW, 2005, p. 86).
The striking characteristic of the Dutch 
Government’s approach is that it has undertaken 
few systematic evaluations into the net impacts of 
the reforms. One analyst found ‘very few attempts’ 
made to measure the impacts of SUWI (de Koning, 
2007, p. 247). The reluctance of the Government 
to undertake such evaluations has been criticised 
by the Dutch Parliament and these criticisms have 
been echoed by the OECD.
Most evidence on outcomes is simply 
the number of people found to have secured 
employment for six months. A ministry progress 
report in 2005, for example, reported the results 
for the fi rst two UWV contracts. The 2001 
results showed that 39 per cent of participants 
on disability benefi t and 46 per cent of those on 
unemployment benefi t had been successfully 
placed, with 32 per cent of each group being 
successfully placed under the 2002 contract (cited 
by Struyven, 2008). Without more rigorous time 
series or evaluations, however, it is not possible 
to assess the extent to which these results refl ect 
the performance of reintegration companies, local 
labour market conditions, selection bias or other 
external factors.5
There has not yet been an evaluation of the 
net impacts or costs of IROs. Anecdotal reports 
refer to the positive effects that IROs have on 
the motivation and engagement of users who 
themselves report higher levels of satisfaction 
with the services received. One evaluation of raw 
outcome results and costs found that, while IROs 
cost more per trajectory, job outcomes are higher. 
In terms of crude cost per placement, IROs were 
more cost effective for those claiming disability 
benefi ts and marginally more expensive for those 
claiming unemployment benefi t (see Table 7).
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Combined ‘work fi rst’ and ‘workfare’ strategies 
have, in the view of the municipalities, contributed 
to signifi cant reductions in the cost of social 
assistance benefi ts. The cumulative impact of 
legislative changes has been a ‘drastic cultural 
change’ with staff now working ‘in a more 
result-oriented manner’ and more focused on 
preventing fraud and on assisting applicants to 
enter employment (Davidse and Kraan, 2008, 
p. 9). It appears, however, that the emphasis in 
the system, at least in the early years, has been 
to reduce the caseload rather than to assist the 
harder to place into work. For example, while 
individual municipalities closely monitor trends in 
the number of social assistance recipients, few 
‘have a follow up system to monitor clients’ (de 
Koning, 2007, p. 237).
Government progress reports on the 
devolution of budgets to municipalities discuss 
trends in social assistance and the degree to 
which recipients are being activated. At the end 
of 2007, the relevant report indicated that the 
number of social assistance recipients in working 
age households had fallen from about 336,000 
in 2003 to about 274,0006 (Davidse and Kraan, 
2008, p. 9). The infl ow of working age applicants 
into social assistance had fallen by 19 per cent 
between 2003 and 2006, and the outfl ow had 
increased from 23 per cent to over 30 per cent in 
2005. The report found that the number of people 
being placed in jobs within two years of starting 
on a reintegration course had increased from 10 
per cent for those commencing in 2002, to 19 per 
cent for those commencing in 2004 and to 27 per 
cent of those starting in the fi rst half of 2005. A 
net impact analysis that fi ltered out other external 
effects suggested that the overall net impact of 
the legislative changes ‘led to an extra reduction 
of 4% in the social assistance volume in the period 
2003–2006’ (Davidse and Kraan, 2008, p. 9).
An independent analysis of two studies 
commissioned by the Ministry and of other local 
municipal studies suggested that the legislative 
changes had accelerated an existing trend. The 
evidence suggested that the municipalities had 
been more successful in reducing the infl ow 
into social assistance and that the increased 
outfl ow was facilitated by a more buoyant labour 
market. The authors reported that about 100,000 
social assistance claimants joined employment 
programmes each year and that an estimated 
30,000 left to enter paid employment. They 
also reported that some 40 per cent of working 
age recipients were exempted from jobsearch 
obligations and that more people left social 
assistance for other reasons, such as retirement 
or repartnering, than did to enter employment. The 
evidence from the studies on cost effectiveness 
and impacts suggested that the net effect of 
employment assistance was ‘positive but small’ 
(van Geuns and van Gent, 2007, p. 15) but few 
municipalities had yet ‘succeeded in achieving 
a high rate of outfl ow to paid employment’ (van 
Geuns and van Gent, 2007, p.17).
Table 7: Characteristics of UWV service users, job outcomes and costs by IRO and by tender, 2004–07
  IRO Tender
Service users Number 66,456 131,323
 Disabled (%) 38 47
 Unemployed (%) 62 53
Price per ‘trajectory’ Disabled (€) 4,730 4,320
 Unemployed (€) 4,431 3,430
Job placement Disabled (%) 40 29
 Unemployed (%) 47 35
Total cost per placement Disabled (€) 7,025 9,980
 Unemployed (€) 6,870 6,540
Source: adapted from Sol (2008, Table 2).
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Conclusion
The creation of the Dutch reintegration market 
has been only one component of a wider 
reform process that transformed welfare state 
entitlements and the governance of the system. 
There has been a sharp learning curve and 
successive adaptations have been made to 
improve the effi ciency of both public and private 
sector providers, and to make them more 
responsive to the needs of their service users. The 
tender system was beset, however, by constant 
re-engineering and high transaction costs both 
for purchasers and providers and for individual 
users. Price competition and micro-management 
of contracts impacted on innovation and service 
quality, with providers delivering standardised, 
infl exible trajectories and users having fewer 
opportunities to engage in more expensive, 
longer-term occupational training. Long-duration 
trajectories provided opportunities for creaming 
and parking, and the public debate, as in Australia, 
has been punctuated by various controversies 
about the poor service received by some users 
and the ‘gaming’ of the system by some providers 
(de Koning, 2007; Struyven, 2008).
Throughout this process there has, however, 
been progressive development in how to manage 
the contracting process, adapt incentives and 
bring more stability into provision. The expansion 
of the market has developed new capacities 
in the private sector and public offi cials have 
become more adept at steering the system. 
Procurement and management skills have been 
more widely dispersed because of the multiplicity 
of purchasers, and entry barriers for new 
providers have been far lower than in Australia 
or Great Britain. The development of IROs and 
framework contracts is initiating a new phase with 
the potential for a more responsive client-driven 
system, at least for those claiming social insurance 
benefi ts. The reintroduction of training budgets 
and a more recent emphasis on longer-term job 
sustainability may offer more durable routes out of 
relative poverty and exclusion – at least for some 
service users.
Municipal devolution has illustrated some of 
the strengths and weaknesses of local control. 
It has enhanced local ownership and political 
accountability for the system, and enabled the 
municipalities to adapt reintegration services to 
diverse local populations and circumstances. 
Municipalities too have experienced a sharp 
learning curve in how to procure from and work 
with private providers, and some have struggled 
to manage these new delivery arrangements. 
Central government has lost some insight into 
local delivery and the ability to steer improvements. 
Local diversity means also an erosion of shared 
national equity and service users with common 
circumstances experience very different local 
welfare regimes, for example, in the expectations 
placed on lone parents. Finally, the incentive 
structure of the block grant may have prioritised 
stricter ‘gatekeeping’ and the exclusion from 
social assistance rather than the provision of more 
effective employment assistance.
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The evidence in this report reveals that contracting 
out of employment assistance services is not a 
simple option. Securing the delivery of government 
objectives through contracts is prone to the 
same implementation problems experienced in 
public sector delivery systems and ‘can falter for 
exactly the same reasons as traditional public 
bureaucracies’ (Chalmers and Davis, 2001, p. 74). 
The lessons from the public policy implementation 
literature are straightforward: ‘successful 
policy making is diffi cult, and its challenges are 
exacerbated by complexity’ (Chalmers and Davis, 
2001, p. 84). Contracting out poses signifi cant 
challenges because it fragments programme 
responsibility among multiple contractors, changes 
the relationship between those who design policy 
and those who deliver front-line services, and blurs 
lines of responsibility and accountability.
The experience of contracting out employment 
services in the Netherlands and Australia has been 
shaped through distinctive traditions, institutions, 
evolving policy objectives and national contexts. 
There are contending views about the success of 
performance-based contracting in each country, 
although evaluations suggest it typically improves 
the short-term job prospects of participants by 
around 5 to 10 per cent, and does so more quickly 
than more standardised programmes (ACOSS, 
2008, p. 12). It is diffi cult, however, to make robust 
comparisons and to disaggregate the impacts 
of market delivery from those of other policy 
changes. There is evidence also that the hardest-
to-help groups are least likely to get jobs and 
those that do are least likely to sustain them in the 
longer term.
The cost-effi ciency gains attributed to the 
Dutch and Australian models appear signifi cant 
but relatively little is known about the extent to 
which these gains have been offset by transaction 
costs for the purchaser, provider and service user. 
A considerable element of the ‘savings’ attributed 
to the Australian model came, for example, from 
closing down more costly employment subsidies 
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and training programmes, and subsequently 
from the competitive pressures generated by the 
relative performance star rating system. Both 
these developments had negative consequences 
for the quality of service delivery for the most 
disadvantaged.
In Australia and the Netherlands there has 
been much ‘learning by doing’ and constant 
adaptation as offi cials have sought to establish 
a market and payment structure that promotes 
competition, increases job outcomes, reduces 
parking, improves service quality and controls the 
perverse incentives that enabled some providers 
to ‘work’ the system. In this process of market 
shaping, policy-makers in both countries have 
introduced more regulation of processes and 
sought stability and investment through longer-
term contracts. Hostile press coverage and public 
concern about ‘fraud’ and poor services increased 
pressure on Australian and Dutch politicians to be 
more interventionist in provider processes, thereby 
constraining scope for fl exibility and innovation.
The DWP (2008a) Commissioning Strategy 
outlines the British Government’s approach to 
developing and managing the welfare market. 
It already incorporates some design features 
informed both positively and negatively by 
overseas experience, especially from the 
Australian system. There are, however, signifi cant 
risks as well as advantages in the structures 
proposed, especially the reliance on large prime 
contractors who will be awarded fi ve- to seven-
year contracts. For example, while long-term 
contracts offer greater incentives for providers 
to invest, innovate and develop specialised local 
networks over a longer period, there are risks 
concerning the renegotiation of the terms of such 
contracts when design faults are identifi ed or 
economic or political circumstances change. When 
complex subcontracting chains are involved, the 
purchaser will have only a restricted insight into 
service delivery, the experience of users and the 
commercial and delivery relationships between the 
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prime contractor and its subcontractors.
In the context of broad agreement between 
the main British political parties on the merits 
of contracting out employment assistance, this 
fi nal chapter considers further lessons on market 
design and safeguards for service users that can 
be extracted from the Australian and Dutch welfare 
markets. It focuses in particular on the design of 
the private sector delivery phase of the fl exible 
New Deal.
Creaming, parking, price 
competition and benefi t savings
The evidence from Australia and the Netherlands 
identifi es two particular risks associated with 
performance-based contracts. The fi rst is 
creaming. This has two aspects. If contractors 
can select at least some of those service users 
with whom they will work, as in the Netherlands, 
they may avoid recruiting the hardest to help. 
Where contractors do not have this fl exibility, as 
in Australia (and Great Britain), they may seek to 
concentrate their efforts on those participants 
closer to the labour market and so more easily 
placed in a job. This second aspect gives rise 
to the problem of parking where harder-to-place 
participants receive less attention or services 
and may make little progress while participating 
in a programme. Should some such ‘parked’ 
participants manage to get jobs through their 
own efforts, this represents a windfall gain for the 
provider concerned.
Contract designers counter these processes 
in a number of ways, chiefl y by providing greater 
fi nancial rewards for placing the harder to help 
into sustained employment. This involves the 
development of a classifi cation system, as 
proposed in the Freud Report (2007), which 
identifi es the level of disadvantage experienced by 
a jobseeker and which is calibrated with outcome 
payments. To avoid perverse incentives, the 
assessment must be undertaken by an agency 
with no direct interest in the outcome.
In both the Netherlands and Australia, 
policy-makers have designed and redesigned 
client profi ling systems but the accuracy of the 
instruments has been vitiated by implementation 
problems. The initial interviews undertaken 
by Centrelink and the CWI often did not 
identify signifi cant barriers, leading to frequent 
reassessments in the Netherlands and re-
referrals to Centrelink in Australia. This increased 
transaction costs for the agencies and individuals 
involved, and delayed engagement with services. 
When the process was simplifi ed in Australia and 
providers were allowed to reclassify participants, 
some were found to have used this fl exibility 
inappropriately to increase their payments and 
position in the star ratings.
There is no easy solution to this problem. In 
the short term this may be less of an issue with the 
fND, as JCP will have worked already with most 
participants for a year before their transition to a 
private provider, or for six months with those to be 
‘fast tracked’ into the system. It will be a complex 
design issue, however, for the wider development 
of the market envisaged by Freud (2007). A related 
issue is the degree to which any classifi cation 
system is an absolute measure of disadvantage, 
calibrated with the resources needed to tackle the 
identifi ed barriers, or whether it will be used fl exibly 
by the purchaser, as DEWR did, to control levels 
of spending. The consequence of the latter option 
was that the proportion of classifi ed ‘hard-to-help’ 
clients declined at a time when the proportion of 
the caseload with signifi cant barriers increased.
Another factor behind the parking of service 
users has been price competition, which has 
since been abandoned in both Australia and the 
Netherlands. Price competition appears to have 
encouraged unrealistic estimates of costs that 
subsequently limited provider capacity, stifl ed 
innovation and encouraged parking. It seems 
clear that too great an emphasis on cost reduction 
undermines service quality.
Purchasers in both countries now select 
providers on tests of quality, including proven track 
records in successful delivery for relevant service 
users. This important criterion has the downside 
of making it diffi cult for new entrants to enter 
the market, even more so in the context of long-
term contracts. Once a delivery market has been 
established, incumbent providers enjoy acquired 
advantages lessening the risk of loss of contract. 
DWP will face a diffi cult trade-off between the 
potential improvements that might be gained from 
a new prime contractor and the transaction costs 
and service delivery disruption that could arise in 
making such a transition.
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In the absence of crude price competition, 
the challenge for the purchaser is to determine 
the level and combination of service fees and 
outcome payments to ensure service quality 
for all participants and suffi cient incentives for 
providers. The model for the fND envisages a 20 
per cent service fee with 80 per cent of provider 
income dependent on interim (13-week) and full 
(26-week) job outcomes. DWP is committed also 
to working with providers to test and ‘develop 
more sophisticated, differentiated models’ of 
outcome payments (DWP, 2008a, p. 22). The 
experience from the other two countries suggests 
that advocates and policy-makers will need to be 
vigilant for any creaming and parking that may 
emerge, especially in the initial stages should 
prime contractors or their subcontractors focus on 
the more job-ready in an effort to secure cash fl ow 
and early profi tability.
Expenditure savings arise not only from 
downward pressure on prices but also from 
reductions in benefi t caseloads secured when 
providers are more successful in placing 
participants into sustained employment. Budgeting 
rules for Dutch municipalities now enable 
purchasers to reinvest any savings from benefi ts 
into employment assistance. Steps towards such 
a model are now emerging in the UK, where 
DWP can retain some of the benefi t savings 
generated by Pathways to Work, and the Treasury 
has agreed to trial a more direct experiment by 
adjusting the arcane ‘DEL and AME’ rules1 (DWP, 
2008b). The Conservative Shadow Chancellor 
has committed to allowing ‘the Government to 
use welfare spending through payment by results 
across the out-of-work benefi t system to get 
people into work’ (Hansard, 13 March, col. 438). 
Such an incentive system needs careful design to 
ensure that the priority is on assisting people into 
employment.
Service quality and outcome 
payments
There is mixed evidence on the quality and 
variability of the services delivered in contracted 
out systems. More positive assessments highlight 
the crucial role played by front-line case managers 
and how their capacity is enhanced when they 
have fl exibility to tailor support to individuals and 
broker job placements with employers. More 
critical evaluations suggest that a combination 
of ‘work fi rst’ provider incentives and inadequate 
funding has seen service providers crowd around 
a common set of minimalist intervention strategies 
(Considine, 2005). These improve the effi ciency of 
jobsearch assistance but do not encourage service 
innovation, or substantial investment in training, 
wage subsidies or other forms of more expensive 
assistance required by those with signifi cant 
employment barriers.
The evolution of contracting systems 
in Australia and the Netherlands has been 
accompanied by various reforms designed 
to ensure levels of individual service delivery. 
The initial models for intensive assistance and 
reintegration trajectories typically required the 
production of an individual action plan but then 
gave considerable autonomy to providers to 
deliver services as they saw fi t. The assumption 
was that contract incentives, calibrated outcome 
payments and provider fl exibility would secure 
public policy outcomes. The emergence of parking 
and the lack of transparency have been responded 
to differently in both countries. In the Netherlands, 
long-term reintegration trajectories have been 
replaced by the purchasing of more specifi c and 
measurable services by reintegration coaches 
and case managers. In Australia, long-duration 
intensive assistance was replaced by six-month 
periods of intensive customised assistance 
with specifi ed jobsearch activities and contact 
requirements between case managers and service 
users. This was supplemented by the introduction 
of the Jobseeker Account that could be used only 
to purchase relevant services for jobseekers.
These developments have relevance for the 
fND where the service delivery requirements 
envisaged include an initial assessment; 
preparation of an action plan; ‘regular contact’, 
as yet unspecifi ed; assistance with tax credits 
and in-work benefi ts; and a mandatory four-week 
period of work-related activity (DWP, 2008c). 
Participants will be placed with a provider for 
up to a year. It is easy to envisage an outcome 
similar to that under the fi rst JN contract where 
providers concentrated intensive service provision 
during the initial stages and towards the end of the 
process, with little contact in between. The role 
of JCP will be important in monitoring the level of 
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service support received by participants. Although 
JSA claimants will continue to sign on fortnightly 
while participating in the fND, it is not clear if 
JCP personal advisers will have any continuing 
responsibility for monitoring the quality of individual 
provision delivered.
Consideration also should be given to a 
mechanism such as the Jobseeker Account, or 
the replacement Employment Pathway Fund, to 
ensure that a signifi cant element of the public 
budget involved is ‘ring-fenced’ for investment 
in jobseekers. It should be possible to do this 
without the level of prescription and compliance 
monitoring that beset the Australian system. It 
could take the form of a ‘Personal Job Account’, 
originally associated with Employment Zones. 
Such a ‘guaranteed’ budget would ensure case 
managers had discretionary resources to deliver 
fl exible investment in disadvantaged jobseekers 
and would constrain any negative tendencies for 
profi t-taking created by over-reliance on outcome-
based incentives.
Signifi cantly, as in Great Britain, both Australia 
and the Netherlands have introduced new funding 
streams for vocational training. A key challenge 
in each of the systems is to ensure that such 
training provision works for service users with 
additional and pre-vocational support needs. 
Another challenge is to combine access to such 
longer-term training provision, where providers are 
paid for delivering accredited qualifi cations, with 
the incentives created by job-focused outcome 
payments. The longer-term solution proposed 
by Freud (2007) envisages a radically different 
outcome funding system that combines rewards 
for long-term job retention and skills acquisition. 
In the near term, it may need a relaxation of 
immediate JSA jobsearch requirements with 
incentives for fND providers to place people into 
jobs after brokering their participation in relevant 
training.
Performance management, 
transaction costs and innovation
When the Netherlands and Australian 
Governments contracted out the delivery of 
employment assistance they lost direct control 
of service delivery and now steer their respective 
systems through contract design, monitoring 
and performance management. This involves 
transaction costs, additional to the signifi cant 
costs already incurred during contract design, 
bid preparation, assessment and the decision 
phase. One important cost is that of collecting 
consistent performance information both for 
monitoring purposes and for an accurate measure 
of relative performance. Contract management 
will be informed by such data and, as in Australia, 
poor performance may trigger further investigation 
and loss of business. The emerging British ‘star 
rating’ performance system, fi rst published in 2008 
for provider performance in Employment Zones, 
appears designed to avoid some unintended 
effects of the Australian relative performance 
system (Tucker and Bateman, 2008). For example, 
it measures performance in relation to individual 
contracts and includes a quality and contract 
compliance assessment. Nevertheless, as the 
system is extended to cover all programmes, care 
must be taken that it does not create perverse 
incentives and shape provider behaviour in 
negative ways.
When service delivery is devolved to 
independent providers the purchaser loses 
insight into the why and how of ‘what works’. 
Contractors and their front-line staff inevitably 
gain an advantage as they develop greater 
operational knowledge of how to achieve specifi ed 
outcomes. There may be a tendency for private 
contractors to regard such knowledge as part 
of their commercial advantage and so they may 
be reluctant to share it, at least in the short term. 
Some of this insight gap may be bridged through 
knowledge acquired by contract management, 
audit and inspection, which may help identify and 
restrict poor performance and ‘short cuts’, and 
identify and spread best practice. It is not clear, 
however, whether welfare market delivery will fi gure 
highly in the priorities of the learning-focused and 
wide-ranging remit of the Offi ce for Standards 
in Education, Children’s Services and Skills that 
recently absorbed the Adult Learning Inspectorate. 
The new standards body and the National Audit 
Offi ce could learn directly from the experiences of 
the ANAO in Australia and IWI in the Netherlands, 
and develop a coherent programme to monitor 
and assess how well the welfare market delivers 
the expected improvements.
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It seems clear from international experience 
that competition alone is insuffi cient to drive 
continuous improvement and, after an initial 
period, further innovation. The development and 
spread of best practices requires exchanges 
and linkages that extend beyond individual 
organisations and often across sectors. Contract 
managers may be able to do some of this but 
DWP and other interested organisations will 
need to further develop a more open structure 
for brokering information exchange and technical 
advice involving prime contractors, subcontractors, 
related public sector organisations and groups that 
can articulate the perspective of service users.
Service user safeguards: ‘voice and 
choice’
Service user journeys across mixed public and 
private provision are complicated, especially for the 
most disadvantaged, such as those with mental 
health issues or those whose fi rst language is not 
English. In both Australia and the Netherlands, 
users are required to make various transitions 
between different service providers and to satisfy 
their various requirements. Many may fi nd these 
transitions smooth but in both countries there 
have been problems with incorrect assessments, 
missed appointments and the imposition of 
sanctions, including variations in how different 
providers handle and report infractions. There 
have been problems also with the fl ow and 
sometimes accuracy of information and data 
exchanged between the respective agencies. 
Transitions between JCP and private providers 
are well established in British provision, although 
they may not always work smoothly. There are 
increased risks associated with the fND because 
of its duration, subcontractor delivery chains and 
the requirement for regular contact with a private 
provider while continuing to ‘sign on’ fortnightly 
with JCP. Service users will need clear and timely 
information to avoid ‘mixed messages’ and it 
will be important to monitor trends in sanctions 
imposed and any differences in provider referrals.
The DWP Commissioning Strategy stresses 
the importance attached to ‘excellent customer 
experience’ and that it will work with representative 
groups and advocacy organisations to develop 
ways of promoting more active customer 
involvement in programmes. Customer feedback 
is to be an integral part of each provider’s 
performance monitoring system and prime 
contractors will be expected to ‘offer customers 
informed choices in the opportunities and services 
they receive and the way they receive them’ (DWP, 
2008a, p. 29). The intention is to give service 
users a choice in those areas with more than one 
prime contractor after the collection of ‘robust’ 
performance information, predicted to be a year 
after the fND starts operating. Several areas – for 
example, most of Wales, Devon and Cornwall, and 
Manchester – will have only one prime contractor. 
Some prime contractors might not subcontract 
provision.
The evidence from Australia suggests that for 
‘choice’ to be effective in motivating jobseekers 
and driving provider behaviour, service users 
need clear information on the services on offer 
and the options available. The Australian star 
ratings give some transparency but little insight 
into the quality of service delivery. The British 
star ratings are being developed only for prime 
contractors, not for the subcontractors where 
many participants will experience service delivery. 
‘Informed choice’ can be meaningful only when 
users have relevant information on the providers 
with whom they will be placed and on the content 
of the service on offer. Such information should 
be communicated about fND providers before 
service users come to the end of their time with 
JCP. While choice is constrained by the jobsearch 
obligations of JSA recipients, individuals should 
still enjoy the option of being able to exercise 
choice at the point of recruitment and after their 
fi rst month of participation. They should be able to 
move at any time if they have legitimate grounds 
to be dissatisfi ed with their experience. Such 
choices should not be restricted to one or two 
prime contractors but extended to the different 
subcontractors who might be available. There 
should be fl exibility to ensure that providers who 
can attract participants can expand their capacity 
to accommodate user choice.
More radically, the success of IROs in the 
Netherlands suggests there may be scope for a 
user-driven alternative to the rather constrained 
choice on offer in the fND. IROs give service users 
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more time to choose a provider and negotiate the 
kind of employment assistance they receive and 
the results appear promising. Experiments with 
such an approach might be tested fi rst in specialist 
DWP disability provision and, if successful, 
extended to fND. It may be feasible for prime 
contractors themselves to experiment with such 
an approach.
Comparative evidence on welfare markets 
confi rms the importance of contracting agencies 
independently monitoring client experience and 
ensuring that robust systems are in place to 
respond to complaints of unfair treatment and poor 
service delivery. There is no customer charter for 
British providers with the type of service standard 
commitments given by JCP in the Jobseeker’s 
Charter. DWP should consider the introduction 
of a clear Service Guarantee as developed in 
Australia, with ultimate recourse to an independent 
complaints line. It should ensure all fND delivery 
sites display such a Service Guarantee with 
information on how to make complaints and 
require providers to keep a complaints register. 
It is important also to establish clear lines of 
responsibility and inter-agency collaboration in 
handling and resolving complaints, and to develop 
a comprehensive system for collating complaints 
information. Effective complaints procedures act 
as a public safeguard, enable systemic problems 
to be identifi ed and provide a mechanism for 
quality assurance.
Contracted providers and non-profi t 
organisations
There has been much debate about the role 
of third-sector and voluntary organisations in 
delivering contracted-out public services, including 
employment assistance. The DWP Commissioning 
Strategy places particular emphasis on their role 
as subcontractors and the potential they offer 
for working with the hardest to help. The prime 
contractor model creates a different market for 
many existing and future potential voluntary and 
third-sector providers who will negotiate with these 
lead suppliers.
There is little systematic evidence on the 
impact of the Netherlands reintegration market 
on non-profi ts, although non-profi t municipal 
providers have lost market share as funding has 
moved from subsidised employment and sheltered 
workshops to reintegration services. For-profi ts 
dominate the UWV market.
In Australia, the non-profi t sector is more 
comparable to that of the UK, although it plays 
a much more signifi cant delivery role across 
a range of social provision. The employment 
service organisations established by religious 
organisations secured a large segment of the JN 
market. Smaller secular voluntary and community 
organisations have fared less well, albeit the 
innovative collaborative structures created by Jobs 
Australia and Job Futures have enabled many 
specialist and community organisations to win 
contracts. Overall, non-profi t involvement has been 
critical for government in ensuring JN coverage of 
areas that are less attractive to for-profi t providers, 
either because of location or because of the 
particular characteristics of client groups.
The involvement of non-profi t organisations 
has raised concerns about the relationship 
between their values and social mission and the 
constraints of contract delivery. There has been 
some evidence of ‘mission drift’ induced through 
the requirements of contracts, especially in the 
role that providers play in imposing conditionality 
and referring people for sanctions. There have 
been other tensions concerning, for example, 
cases where church-based providers delivering JN 
contracts questioned job applicants about their 
religious beliefs, suggesting that subscribing to a 
particular religion was a condition of employment 
(Mulgan, 2005, p. 65). Non-profi ts as well as 
for-profi ts have other accountabilities to those 
contained in contracts and these will not always 
correspond with public purposes.
In all three countries, providers have emerged 
as a distinct interest group and powerful lobbying 
force, with direct access to senior civil servants 
and ministers. In Great Britain, many providers 
are now organised in the Employment Related 
Services Association and have played a signifi cant 
role in the debate on the future shape of the British 
welfare market. Providers have a legitimate interest 
in lobbying for additional resources and reform 
of market design so long as it is borne in mind 
that provider interests do not always correspond 
with those of users. Others point out that the 
interests of many local and smaller charities and 
community-based organisations may differ from 
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those of ‘large multi-million pound charities that 
operate at a national or even an international level’, 
either ‘in terms of their relationship with the local 
community or closeness to their client group’ 
(Davies, 2006, p. 6).
There already have been tensions between 
for-profi t and voluntary sector providers about 
unfair competition in Great Britain, most notable 
in the allocation of the earlier prime contracts for 
Pathways to Work. As a consequence, DWP has 
established a Third Sector Taskforce to identify 
both the ‘role and value of the third sector’ and 
any ‘impediments to [its] playing a full and active 
role in welfare to work reform’ (ACEVO, 2008).
The relationship with providers at times can 
be uncomfortable for government. In Australia, for 
example, some were openly critical of the impact 
that changes had on their viability and service 
provision and questioned government policy. 
There was particular controversy about ‘gagging 
clauses’ in JN contracts that progressively sought 
to prohibit such criticisms, especially from the 
non-profi t sector. The new Government is revoking 
these clauses. Such criticism is an important 
dimension of public debate and encourages 
accountability. DWP contracts and those of prime 
contractors should allow such informed and 
free comment, and not constrain the ability of 
non-profi ts in particular to advocate on behalf of 
disadvantaged communities.
In future it will be important to monitor the 
dominant role of larger providers in the British 
market. The transition to prime contractors 
is likely to reshape the landscape, with for-
profi t organisations with access to risk capital 
dominating service provision. The future 
for many voluntary and community-based 
organisations, and some for-profi t providers, 
will be as subcontractors. It will be important to 
understand the impacts of the new market on the 
organisational capacity and social capital of local 
areas and the extent to which this may be at risk 
should market conditions change and larger for-
profi ts remove their capital to seek greater profi ts 
elsewhere.
Another risk is that of market failure. In both 
Australia and the Netherlands some providers 
have gone out of business while holding contracts, 
notably the privatised companies formed from 
the previous PES. In Great Britain there have 
been provider bankruptcies, causing disruption 
to individual service users and requiring speedy 
intervention by the public sector to shore up the 
capacity of local delivery systems. The continuing 
role of JCP, with its national coverage, and the 
DWP’s commitment to actively manage the market 
and ensure that in most areas there are at least 
two prime contractors operating, should minimise 
(although not eliminate) the risk of performance or 
fi nancial failure.
Contracts and accountability
Contracts for the delivery of employment 
assistance services involve more than solely 
commercial considerations. These types of 
arrangements are often referred to as ‘relational 
contracts’. They specify performance, delivery 
specifi cations and the fi nancial terms of the 
agreement, but include also an agreement to 
co-operate in pursuing wider common objectives 
and, to cover unforeseen circumstances, contain 
commitments to more general values. The JN 
contract, for example, requires ‘members to 
act with honesty, due care and diligence’ and 
to behave ‘ethically and professionally’. The 
DWP Commissioning Strategy contains similar 
aspirations with a Code of Conduct that ‘spells out 
the key values and principles of behaviour which 
DWP expects of providers and which are essential 
for creating healthy, high performing supply chains’ 
(DWP, 2008a, p. 31). Mulgan (2006) suggests that, 
through such arrangements, the purchaser seeks 
to shape the ways in which providers exercise 
operational discretion and every attempt is made 
to encourage contractors and their staff to act 
with the same professionalism as that expected of 
public offi cials.
The accountability of contracted providers 
is, however, more limited than that of public 
sector organisations. They are subject to the 
normal legal requirements that apply to all private 
companies and charities and, since the passage 
of the Freedom of Information Act (2000), 
completed contracts and possibly unsuccessful 
bids may be released if requested by the public, 
including information that the bidder might 
regard as ‘commercially sensitive or confi dential’ 
(DWP, 2008d, p. 13). Nevertheless, there are 
limits concerning the accountability of private 
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contractors to parliamentary committees, audit 
authorities and the Human Rights Act (1998), and 
they are beyond the scope of the ombudsman.
Contracting out of employment and other 
such services also poses challenges for political 
accountability. Ministers remain politically 
responsible for service outcomes and the effective 
use of public funds even though in practice they 
have less control over the actions of private 
contractors and more limited means of intervening 
in their activities. There is considerable scope for 
‘blame shifting’ and the responsibility for poor 
performance is less obvious. In this context, the 
role of independent challenge and scrutiny is of 
particular importance, especially when ministers, 
senior offi cials and providers have a clear interest 
in promoting the success of contracting out.
Conclusion
Over the next decade, it will become clearer 
whether British policy-makers and those entrusted 
with implementing the welfare market have 
managed to fashion a contracting regime that has 
harnessed the resources and the capacities of 
the private and third sectors to deliver improved 
personalised services that assist workless people 
to get and keep jobs. It may be that contracting 
out these services simply will reduce the visibility 
of government decisions and disguise reductions 
in the funding and quality of welfare to work 
programmes. While much care has gone into 
the design of the new system, we may fi nd 
that, after implementation, services for the most 
disadvantaged become mired in the same delivery 
problems that undermined the bureaucratic 
systems that the Australian and Dutch welfare 
markets replaced.
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List of abbreviations
General
IT Information technology
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PES Public employment service
VET Vocational education and training
UK
DWP Department for Work and Pensions
EZ Employment Zone
fND Flexible New Deal
JCP Jobcentre Plus
JSA Jobseeker’s Allowance
Australia
ANAO Australian National Audit Offi ce
APM Active Participation Model
DEWR Department of Employment and Workplace Relations
DSP Disability Support Pension
IA Intensive assistance
ISca Intensive Support Customised Assistance
JCA Job Capacity Assessment
JN Job Network
JSCI Jobseeker Classifi cation Instrument
JSKA Jobseeker Account
WftD Work for the Dole
Netherlands
CWI Central Organisation for Work and Income and Centres for Work and Income
IRO Individual Reintegration Agreement
IWI Inspection Service for Work and Income
RWI Council for Work and Income
SUWI Implementation Structure for Work and Income Act (2001)
SZW Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment
UWV Institute for Employee Benefi t Schemes
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Notes
Chapter 1
1 For consistency, this report refers to DEWR 
throughout but the name of the Department 
has changed slightly over the past ten years 
to refl ect changes in its remit. In 2007, the 
incoming Labor Government made a further 
change and it is now the Department for 
Education, Employment and Workplace 
Relations (DEEWR).
2 Job Futures was created in 1997 to establish a 
viable business model for smaller community-
based providers to work in the new market. 
It acts like a franchise but is directly owned 
by the licensees. It holds the government 
contract, which it then subcontracts to its 
members. After the third contracting round, its 
members were delivering services in 65 sites 
and were collectively the leading provider of 
specialist contracts.
Chapter 2
1 Maatwerk, for example, has operations in 
a number of countries, including France, 
Germany and the UK, where it has delivered 
services for JCP and local authorities. At the 
end of 2007, Maatwerk was taken over by 
ResCare, a large US human services provider, 
which at the same time acquired another small 
British provider, Biscom.
2 Estimates provided by Boaborea to the author 
in December 2007.
3 Report fi ndings summarised during author 
interview with IWI in December 2007.
4 Estimates provided by Boaborea to the author 
in December 2007.
5 Up-to-date job placement data for individual 
reintegration companies is given in Dutch on 
the UWV and RWI websites, and is intended to 
inform the choices of purchasers and service 
users.
6 At the end of 2007, 58 per cent of working 
age households receiving social assistance in 
Holland were comprised of single people, 27 
per cent were lone parents and the rest were 
couples. Thirty-eight per cent were members 
of ‘non-western ethnic minorities’ (Davidse and 
Kraan, 2008, p. 3).
Chapter 3
1 The DWP budget is divided between 
departmental expenditure limits (DEL), from 
which employment programmes are funded 
and annually managed expenditure (AME), 
from which benefi ts are paid. Treasury rules 
currently do not allow money saved on benefi t 
expenditure by investment in employment 
programmes to be used as further investment 
in such programmes or as a reward for 
performance (Freud, 2007, p. 67).
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Appendix 1
Australian working 
age benefi ts
About 1.5 million Australians relied on working age 
benefi ts in 2007. This included around 450,000 
people on Newstart or Youth Allowance, 400,000 
on Parenting Payment and 650,000 people on 
Disability Support Pension. All Australian benefi ts 
are means-tested and subject to income and 
assets tests. All claimants subject to activity/
participation requirements must report fortnightly 
to Centrelink and register and attend interviews 
with a ‘Provider of Australian Government 
Employment Services’.
Newstart Allowance is a fortnightly 
unemployment benefi t paid to eligible people aged 
between 21 and 65. Recipients have to agree a 
‘Preparing for Work Agreement’ and are expected 
to make up to ten ‘Job Search Contacts’ per 
fortnight and record the details of these jobs on a 
‘Participation Contact Record’.
Youth Allowance is paid to young Australians 
participating in full-time study or in an Australian 
Apprenticeship, or actively looking for work or 
undertaking a combination of activities leading 
to employment. ‘Youth’ is defi ned as 15–24 for 
full-time students or 15–20 for jobseekers. The 
payment is subject to a family means test unless 
a young person demonstrates they are living 
independently.
Disability Support Pension (DSP) provides 
income support for people with a long-term 
disability, which, in the opinion of an assessor, 
they will not recover from within the next two 
years and which means they cannot work more 
than 15 hours a week. While DSP eligibility is 
being determined, claimants are placed on 
another payment (usually Newstart with a medical 
certifi cate exempting them from the activity test).
Parenting Payment is paid to principal carers 
of dependent children under the age of 6 for 
partnered claimants and children under the age 
of 8 for single claimants or aged less than 16 if 
they were in receipt of Parenting Payment prior 
to 1 July 2006. This latter group may remain on 
this payment until their youngest child turns 16 
but they are subject to participation requirements 
when this child turns 7.
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Appendix 2
Job Network Service 
Guarantee
You will receive ongoing personalised employment 
services provided by your preferred Job Network 
member. These services will be culturally sensitive 
to your circumstances and background as well 
as tailored both to your needs and to the job 
opportunities available.
You can expect your chosen Job Network 
member to:
• provide access to job vacancy information 
and jobsearch facilities through touch-screen 
kiosks;
• advise you on jobsearch techniques, 
career options and vocational employment 
programmes and other services available to 
you;
• give you feedback on a job interview if your 
Job Network member arranged it for you;
• help you to meet your income support 
obligations when you are looking for work.
The services will include:
• recording your résumé summary and resulting 
résumé in JobSearch;
• matching of your résumé summary against 
vacancies in JobSearch;
• establishing a password for access to your 
personal page and job matches on JobSearch;
• immediate access to any job matches via your 
personal page with additional advice, where 
arranged, through your personalised email, 
SMS or telephone message bank service.
If you have been registered with Centrelink as 
unemployed for more than three months and are 
receiving Intensive Support services, your Job 
Network member will also:
• assess your skills, experience and capabilities 
and develop an Activity Agreement to help you 
get work;
• help you to improve your jobsearch skills by 
giving you intensive jobsearch training and 
additional support to help you make job 
applications;
• contact you regularly, at least every three 
months and more frequently if you have been 
registered for more than 12 months.
If you are receiving Intensive Support services 
subject to the assessment of your needs, your Job 
Network member services may also include:
• help with access to training, a wide range of 
vocational programmes, counselling and other 
services and work experience consistent with 
your Activity Agreement;
• more intensive jobsearch activities and work 
preparation with fortnightly contact to help you 
into a job;
• additional services, facilities and activities, 
such as interpreter services, travel assistance 
if you are referred to a job interview by your 
Job Network member, vocational training, or 
counselling you may require to get a job;
• support while you are settling into your new 
job.
If you are not satisfi ed with the service you have 
received, you should raise this fi rst with your Job 
Network member. If you are still not satisfi ed, 
then you should phone the DEWR Job Network 
customer service line on 1800 805 260, which will 
endeavour to resolve your concerns quickly and 
fairly.
Source: www.workplace.gov.au/workplace/
Programmes/JobNetwork/ServiceGuarantee.htm 
(accessed 20 May 2008).
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Appendix 3
Overview of proposed Job Network model for 
2009
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Appendix 4
Netherlands main 
working age benefi ts 
in 2008
In December 2007, Statistics Netherlands reported 
that, out of a total working age population of about 
7.5 million, there were just under 850,000 people 
receiving disability benefi ts; 192,000 receiving 
unemployment benefi t; and 274,000 receiving 
social assistance.
Unemployment Insurance Benefi t
A claimant must be available for, and actively 
seeking, work and may restrict the jobs they are 
seeking only for a defi ned period. If eligible an 
individual is entitled to:
• two months’ benefi t at 75 per cent of the 
previous or minimum wage, and a third month 
at 70 per cent, for those who have worked for 
26 weeks of the 39 weeks preceding the claim 
to benefi t;
• six months to maximum of 38 months at 70 
per cent of previous wage subject to an upper 
wage limit. Duration depends on employment 
history.
Disability Insurance Benefi t
Since January 2006, employers must pay an 
employee a minimum of 70 per cent of the 
previous wage level for two years (many Collective 
Labour Agreements increase this to 100 per cent 
for the fi rst year). After initial registration, a case 
will be reassessed by the UWV after two years. If 
an individual is judged at less than 35 per cent of 
previous earning capacity then the employer must 
try to provide other employment, either within or 
outside the organisation, before a termination of 
employment is considered.
If loss of earning capacity is more than 35 
per cent but less than 80 per cent, or up to 100 
per cent but there is a reasonable chance of 
recovery, the individual is then eligible for WGA, 
a wage-related benefi t. The benefi t is designed 
to encourage the person to work and any wages 
will be supplemented up to a certain proportion of 
their previous or to a proportion of the minimum 
wage. The actual amounts vary in relation to the 
period of the claim, the income earned and the 
degree of disability.
A separate IVA benefi t is paid to adults judged 
fully and permanently disabled, and a WAJONG 
benefi t to young people disabled from the age of 
18. Eligible individuals are entitled to:
• 70 per cent of previous wage subject to upper 
limit until retirement age for those who are fully 
disabled (lost 80 to 100 per cent of earning 
capacity);
• 70 per cent of minimum wage until retirement 
age for young people who are fully disabled 
before being able to qualify for work-related 
benefi t.
Social assistance
The central ministry determines a ‘social minimum’ 
income that varies according to family size and is 
set in relation to the minimum wage. Entitlement 
is subject to income and asset tests. There 
are supplements for additional needs, such as 
childcare or rent, and for those who have been on 
the benefi t for over fi ve years and have no chance 
of a return to work. Entitlement for young people 
aged between 18 and 21 is set in relation to the 
level of Child Benefi t and normally subject to a 
parental means test.
Social assistance recipients who are judged 
employable, including lone parents whose 
youngest child is aged over 5 years, must be 
available for and actively seeking work and are 
expected to take any ‘generally acceptable 
job’, subject to limited conditions decided by 
the municipality concerning, for example, the 
availability of childcare. Young people receiving 
social assistance are expected to complete basic 
education or are generally required to participate 
in employment programmes up to the age of 
27. In 2007, only 20,000 young people received 
social assistance, half of whom were lone parents 
(OECD, 2008).
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